

I was taught to think about whether my religious beliefs are rational.





The Last Days Of United Pakistan
On December 16, 1971 the Pakistan army in Bangladesh unconditionally surrendered to the joint Indian and Bangladeshi forces. With the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, Bangladesh came into being and united Pakistan was at an end.
However, in Pakistan the state-controlled and censored media was in denial. The day after General Niazi of Pakistan had surrendered all 93,000 soldiers and paramilitary units under his command in Bangladesh and the guns had fallen silent in the East, the Dawn newspaper, published from Karachi, declared: “WAR TILL VICTORY”. The story of the Pakistani surrender was contained in one sentence of an article entitled “Fighting ends in East Wing: PAF hits in West”. The surrender was spun as follows:
Latest reports indicate that following an arrangement between the local commanders of India and Pakistan in the Eastern theatre, fighting has ceased in East Pakistan and Indian troops have entered Dacca.
While newspaper headlines around the world announced the surrender of the Pakistani army and the creation of Bangladesh, the Pakistani population were presented with an alternate reality. This alternate reality would continue for four more days until the collapse of the military regime of Yahya Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the man who failed to win the prime ministership of a united Pakistan a year ago at the ballot box, would now take over as leader of the remaining wing of Pakistan.
Below are the front pages of the Dawn newspaper from December 4, 1971 to December 20, 1971. The headlines chronicle the unraveling of the false reality created by the military regime in the last days of united Pakistan. [Click the images for a PDF of the front page.]
December 4, 1971
India enters the war on December 3, 1971 to stop the genocide in Bangladesh.

I was taught to think about whether my religious beliefs are rational.

Whose concept of modernity are Muslim women supposed to accept and adhere to?

"Designer collaborations lend legitimacy to lawn since they are transporting the fabric into the realm of high fashion" - Gul Ahmed’s Director, Ziad Bashir
1. Paying over Rs4,000 for an outfit that you could probably not even pull off at a fancy dinner. This especially stings after you invest an additional Rs1,000 on getting the stitching done from the nikumma tailor who will probably have the outfit ready by summer 2012.
2. No matter how exclusive and special the print may be, come June 1st, your maid is going to walk into your home wearing an exact copy of the same.
3. The group of women present at every freaking exhibition. I call them the lawn mowers. They mow out each and every lawn suit before you even read the billboard! How many outfits do these ladies need?
4. How every struggling, not-struggling, successful, unsuccessful, living, dying, barely-breathing designer has come up with his/her own lawn collection. Why don’t they go back to making super-expensive, un-wearable clothes that nobody ever bought?
5. The way they offer all these different laces and frills with the jora to make your life easier but with 50 extra things per outfit, they usually end up confusing you and Nikumma.
6. And this may very well be the reason that each year Nikumma will always put the wrong lace on the wrong jora making you look like Ugly Betty without the glasses.
7. After visiting two exhibitions, they all start looking the same.
8. The life-size billboards with giant models in every freaking position that keep distracting my driver every time we pass the roundabout. Yes, I almost had an accident — Vaneeza is to blame!
9. How they’re all sold out on the very first day. I think they just make up some posters and write ‘sold out’ on them to make it look like their launch was exclusive and successful.
10. With every passing year, the material for lawns keeps getting sheerer and sheerer. Pretty soon we’ll be in crepe paper but, the designers will convince us, it’s extremely high quality, flown in from Florence, extra-breathable and wrinkle-free. What more do you want?



A summit of spymasters this week eased tensions but failed to resolve issues over U.S. drones and espionage that have imperiled the vital relationship between the CIA and Pakistan's main intelligence agency.
The United States and Pakistan have an uneasy alliance as U.S. soldiers fight the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan and the fragile government in Islamabad faces internal threats from Islamist militants and anti-American sentiment.
The case of a CIA contractor who killed two Pakistanis sent anger boiling and threatened the CIA's campaign of aerial drone strikes against militants hiding in Pakistan's tribal areas.
The U.S. spy agency is willing to expand consultations with Pakistan over drone operations, U.S. officials told Reuters after CIA Director Leon Panetta hosted Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency.
ISI chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha, fresh off obtaining his second one-year extension, went to Washington for a meeting with his CIA counterpart Leon Panetta making demands that are completely unobtainable. Leaks to the media, as the Pasha-Panetta talks got underway,indicate that the Pakistan Army wants a complete halt to drone strikes in the tribal areas and the removal of all CIA agents currently roaming the country.
On the face of it, both demands are the right ones to make. Drone attacks, while being promoted by the US government (always through anonymous sources since the Americans do not officially confirm that it is using drones) as the most effective way to kill militants, is effective only in the sense that is risk-free for the country using them. Unmanned drones ensures that no American lives are lost in the hunt for militants; the lives of Pakistani civilians do not factor into the equation. Equally, no Pakistani patriot likes the idea of trigger-happy spooks traipsing around, bound by no law.
Let’s get real though. Making demands is one thing. Expecting those demands to be fulfilled is quite another. The alliance between the US and Pakistan is often called a “transactional relationship.” The US pays for what it wants and we give it to them, holding our nose and counting the cash. In such a relationship you don’t get to have your complaints heard.
Before making demands, we need leverage. Cash-strapped as we are, we cannot tell the US to keep its foreign aid and we’ll keep our sovereignty, thank you very much. The problem is we do not have any other kind of leverage either. The US has two fears about Pakistan: that the country will be taken over by terrorists or that they will get their hands on our nuclear arsenal. As much as we use the Taliban threat – and it is a very real threat, although not one that will take over the government, as panicked Westerners fear – to wring more strings-attached aid out of the US, ultimately everyone knows that it is equally in Pakistan’s interest to keep the Taliban at bay. Sure, we may use them and keep them alive to bolster our misguided policy, but the Taliban is as much a threat to the military and civilian leadership here as it is to the US. Similarly, we cannot bluff the Americans into agreeing to our demands by implying that we will hand over a nuke or two to the militants. Basically, it all boils down to having no leverage.
There is one negotiating tactic the military could use, although its chances for success are slim. Pakistan is a vital supply route for Nato forces in Afghanistan, one that the army could threaten to shut down if some of their concerns aren’t addressed. It would be inconvenient for the US to rely solely on Central Asian routes to supply the coalition forces so perhaps this threat could get us a minor concession or two. For that, too, the window of opportunity is narrow. If President Barack Obama follows through on his promise to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan next years, Pakistan’s role as a hub will diminish.
The army, for its part, knows that its complaints amount only to public posturing. We went through this whole charade with army opposition to the Kerry-Lugar Bill, where it was made clear that the army did not like being dictated to by the US. Yet it, and the country, ended up accepting the aid and the conditions attached to it and the issue is a forgotten one. As was the case then, the army’s main motive was to make its displeasure known domestically. This essentially boils down to the army trying to maintain its sense of self-pride by telling everyone that they know they have to accept American control but they certainly don’t like it. Everyone fretting about the US-Pakistan alliance should just keep that in mind and tone down the alarmism.