Wither vs whether Pakistan

The adage that you can't judge a book by its cover is apparently not true in the case of Pakistan. Consider the following top ten recently published books on Pakistan: (1) Pakistan: Beyond the crisis state; (2) Playing with fire: Pakistan at war with itself. (3) The unraveling: Pakistan in the age of jihad; (4) Pakistan on the brink; (5) Pakistan: Eye of the storm; (6) Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global jihad; (7) Fatal Fault Lines: Pakistan, Islam and the West; (8) Pakistan: the most dangerous place in the world; (9) Pakistan Cauldron: conspiracy, assassination and instability; (9) Pakistan: The scorpion's tail; (10) Pakistan: terrorism ground zero. To top it all, The Future of Pakistan, which is a collection of essays by noted Pakistan-hands, makes bold to provoke the debate of "Whither" vs "Whether" Pakistan.

Pakistan is wracked by ten major crises. (1) Crisis of Economy - this is characterized by stagflation, dependency, resource scarcity and mass impoverishment. (2) Crisis of Education - this is characterized by the Madrassah challenge, jihad indoctrination, English-Urdu apartheid. (3) Crisis of Urbanisation - this is characterized by slum development, criminalization, ethnic warfare. (4) Crisis of Demography - this is characterized by a youth bulge, religious conservatism and class volatility. (5) Crisis of Foreign Policy - this is characterized by conflict, isolation and estrangement. (6) Crisis of terrorism and radicalization - this is characterized by Islamic extremism, violent sectarianism and ethnic separatism. (7) Crisis of Civil-Military Relations - this is characterized by military domination and civilian incapacity. (8) Crisis of Political System and Governance - this is characterized by corruption, incompetence and autocracy. (9) Crisis of Law and Order - this is characterized by state-organ failure and constitutional gridlock. (10) Crisis of Identity - this is characterized by tension between notions of Nation-State vs Pan-Islamism, being primarily Pakistani vs Muslim, and having South Asian vs Middle-Eastern roots.

The critical questions that need to be asked as factors shaping the future of Pakistan may therefore be noted. Will the National Security State based on an India-centricity that is defined, articulated and practiced by the prevalent military power continue to dominate the narrative of Pakistan as it has done for six decades with disastrous consequences? Will the blowback of civil war and foreign intervention in Afghanistan come to hurt and haunt Pakistan as a consequence of its regional policies and alliances? Will the Pakistan army's evolution as a home-spun, religio-political, anti-American entity hurt the national interest? Will the economy's stagnation and foreign-dependency deny the imperative of popular upward mobility and relatively equitable distribution of resources and incomes? Will India's gain and Pakistan's loss of American support in the future exacerbate the internal and external pains of Pakistan? Will Pakistan's internal political dynamics lead to gridlock, instability, anarchy and progressive state breakdown?

In this context, various future scenarios can be debated and discussed. Will Pakistan begin to look like Somalia where the state has collapsed and armed, ideological, ethnic, separatist, tribal and sectarian non-state actors have seized local power? Will Pakistan be Balkanized like Yugoslavia into warring states wracked by civil war and foreign intervention? Will Pakistan be ripe for the plucking by Islamic revolutionaries? Will Pakistan slide into a fourth military take-over? Will Pakistan grope towards some sort of liberal and constitutional democracy in which all organs of the state and civil society play their defined roles with relative stability and equilibrium? Or will Pakistan continue to "muddle along" for the next three decades as it has done for the last six decades and learn to cope with its problems without keeling over into state-collapse or war?

Most thinkers are inclined to bet on the 'muddling through" forecast only because they cannot build a "black swan" event of cataclysmic proportions and dire consequences into their equations. This could be a war with India precipitated by suicidal non-state actors in which nuclear weapons are eventually used. Or it could be global isolation coupled with economic sanctions as a consequence of Pakistan's isolationist and honour-bound domestic and foreign policies. Or it could be another attack on US soil by non-state actors whose footprints lead to Pakistan's urban or tribal areas. Any of these could exacerbate any of Pakistan's core crises and lead to scenarios of state collapse, or anarchy, or implosion, or Balkanisation or a military coup by Islamist officers.

If the long-term prognosis is unclear, the short term forecast, unfortunately, is not. US-Pak relations are not going to improve significantly. The economy will remain in the doldrums, foreign investment will be shy, and energy will be scarce. Governance will continue to be poor. The military will dominate foreign policy. If elections are held, coalition politics will come to prevail, with emphasis on regionalism, ethnicity and religious conservatism. In other words, there will be no paradigm change. The greater tragedy is that the next crop of political and military leaders is no better than the current one

By Najam Sethi http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20120420&page=1

INTERVIEW: 

“There is broad thinking that the US cannot afford to walk away like they’ve done twice” — Riaz Mohammad Khan

Pakistan is an important ally for the US in this region but the relationship is periodically fractured and mired in distrust. How has this changed for the worse?

This downturn in relations needs to be arrested. Here basically the government has asked parliament to review relations because this has become an emotive issue and Pakistan is close to an election. After the Salala incident last year, the government said that all stakeholders should share responsibility for whatever policy is chalked out.

Any sensible ruling government would want normal relations with the US. It is not about receiving aid but we need American goodwill, especially when it comes to trade and economic matters. There are specific issues precipitated by events in 2011, the Raymond Davis case, Osama bin Laden and Salala. Some of these should have been anticipated and prevented like in the Davis case when CIA contractors were given visas and allowed to enter the country in large numbers. There was already the experience of Blackwater in Iraq in 2006. If CIA contractors were given visas by the foreign office, then this kind of incident was bound to happen because the Americans don’t always understand local culture. Where the OBL issue is concerned, the Americans also overreached in many ways and there was need for better sensitivity on their part. Then if you look at the history of drone attacks, these strikes escalated in 2010 compared to 2007-08. There was pressure from Pakistan that these strikes should be coordinated.

Drone attacks escalated with the Obama government despite Pakistan’s objections. Also intelligence sharing between both
governments also continues.

The first drone attack targeted Nek Mohammad in 2004 in South Waziristan and he was more of a nuisance for us than the Americans. In 2010 these strikes escalated. There is controversy that a large number of people have been killed and very few were targets and so the net result was anger that feeds militancy rather than helping the situation.

After the recent parliamentary review on relations between the US and Pakistan, will drone attacks increase?
There has been a considerable reduction and I don’t think there will be another escalation. We have every right to ask the US not to fly drones over Pakistani territory and that they respect our sovereignty. However, that also calls for certain responsibility on our part. That Pakistani territory must not be used for militant activities and if Pakistan fails to exercise that responsibility then we should expect an escalation of drone strikes or other forms of retaliation.

How vital will Pakistan remain to US interests in the region after the drawdown begins in Afghanistan? In the future, how will cross-border militancy be reduced at a time when Nato and Afghan forces end joint-operations?
There is talk of a counterterrorism force based in Afghanistan on special bases but there’s a question mark about the Status of Force Agreement that will not be negotiated this year. These kinds of issues will be negotiated in 2013 because there is an election next year. So far there is no final agreement on how many US forces will stay back after 2014. There have been negotiations about night raids and Afghan prisons to be handed over to the government. What we expect next month at the Nato summit is firm commitment on funding Afghan security. So far there is indication that the US will certainly continue with substantial aid assistance. And we know the Afghan economy today is sustained by a war economy. There is broad thinking that the US cannot afford to walk away like they’ve done twice. The consequence of the first was 9/11 and of the second, the revival of the Taliban insurgency after the US was distracted with Iraq.

What scenario do you see for a post-Karzai term?
Let’s not talk about the politics of the region because there are surprises. We are not talking about settled democratic institutions but conflict situations, fluid situations. So for anyone to give an answer to what could happen during the post-Karzai transition is difficult. Even if Karzai remained, my guess would be that economic assistance will continue.

In, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity, you explain that backing the Afghan Taliban is not a viable option because it would threaten Pakistan’s internal security. How can we counter growing extremism and an overtly religious narrative in Pakistan?

If we talk about the local extremists, obscurantists, we have to deal with it as a society, as a country, as a people. And my thesis says there is an intellectual crisis. Today you will find educated people sympathising with the Taliban’s worldview and praising them.

Is this a new phenomenon?
This kind of religious extremism has grown over a period of years. This crisis of thought and confusion is not just restricted to the Taliban and their sympathizers. Take the example of how madrassas have gained support. I have seen educated and progressive people who believe these are the best charitable institutions. Now the confusion in this kind of thinking, as I see it, is that you leave two and a half million of the country’s young people and children to these institutions and have no concept of what they study, how useful they will become as citizens after their studies and what they will adopt as professions if at all. Are they getting vocational training, studying the sciences and can they get into colleges after? Can they opt to become doctors, engineers after a madrassah education? Those who say that these are the best institutions are confused about contemporary challenges to a modern society. This pattern of thought has become more pronounced in society today permeating into public discourse on policy and politics.

Should Pakistan play a role in the Afghan reconciliation process, especially when it’s about bringing certain factions of the Taliban’s older leadership to negotiate?
Reconciliation itself is validation of Pakistan’s position on the Taliban which it took at the time of the first Bonn process. At the time Pakistan suggested to the Americans that they bring the Taliban into the fold because they were part of the political landscape. Then the US had grouped the Taliban together with al Qaeda under one militant umbrella organisation. Once the Americans turned around on their policy, it was a validation of Pakistan’s position. They could afford to change their position as a superpower. There are others who have a role apart from the Afghans when negotiations happen: the US as the occupying force and Pakistan due to its peculiar geographic position. Pakistan must not thrust its position and demand a seat on the table but play a positive role to persuade the Taliban. We have never been able to convince the Afghans in the past even when they were eating out of our hands because of our ‘soft’ culture. My book brings out this point about the mujahedeen before the Taliban that Pakistan failed to convince.

How important are the Haqqani’s to Pakistan as strategic assets?
It is not that Pakistan gives sanctuary because then we would consider them assets. I have strongly contested this point. They are not assets because they cannot go into Kabul as part of a future set-up. If you look at the history of the Haqqani’s, they are part of the Zarghan tribe in North Waziristan, Khost, Paktia and Paktika. They are the strongest tribe with influence. Now, how do you tackle this situation as Pakistan? It’s a historically embedded situation that you can’t take head-on because your own countrymen will say that Pakistan is fighting someone else’s war against its own people. You see the complexity. It is important to recognise this because in Swat it was not until public opinion turned against the Pakistani Taliban that the army went in and two million people were displaced. But that is a separate theatre.

On reconciliation with the Taliban I don’t feel the Americans are clear. They called off the Qatar process and they now feel that the Afghans should work it out themselves. They are also trying to weaken the Taliban in many other ways. They are spending about $10 billion per month only on the army which will be reduced.

What choices do the Americans have?
Things are changing in Afghanistan. The Taliban will not return. Mullah Omar won’t go back to capture Kabul. There is economic vibrancy in the country. The old Taliban leadership might want to reconcile and are trying to go back and Gulbadin Hekmatyar is trying to negotiate a position. But local influences should be accommodated and that is a process that the Afghans will determine. It’s not something that the Americans or Pakistan can determine.

Should Pakistan know better than to demand a role in the endgame given its own internal crisis?
If anyone is looking for a neat cut off, that won’t happen. The best solution is that the violence decreases. It’s an amorphous situation and a neat strategic plan would be simply academic. In that overall view, Pakistan should look out for two variables.
We must hold back because if we are pro-active, it is will create problems within Afghanistan and we should not interfere and sponsor any groups. Secondly, we must have confidence that the nature of Pak-Afghan relations is such that Pakistan has an indispensable importance for Afghanistan and in a reverse way that holds true for Afghanistan. Turmoil in Afghanistan would impact Pakistan and vice versa.

How do Afghanistan’s historic regional neighbours react to this situation?
Central Asia is concerned about northern Afghanistan, which is quite stable because of the warlords. There is no factionalism, and as long as there’s no violence, then it’s an acceptable situation. The sensible thing would be to let the Afghan’s deal with their problems. They are past masters at playing with outside influences and if these are reduced then they are pragmatic enough to progress.

Does Pakistan’s objection to Indian economic influence make sense?
Pakistan cannot and must not object to India giving assistance. When it comes to other areas such as training the forces, then there are many questions: if they are trained by India then one questions the overall mind-set of these troops. Why shouldn’t Turkey train the army or Nato continue training the Afghan forces. The Afghan government should be sensitive to this aspect and Pakistan should have no reservation on the economic and reconstruction aspects.

After the recent Kabul attacks, would you say the Afghan national forces are capable of taking control of security post-2014?

What has emerged from these attacks is that the national army was able to cope with it in a city like Kabul with minimum casualties within a sufficient time period. If we were to go by that then I think such incidents should be a source of confidence to the new army. In this transition period, one of the more important aspects is whether the army is ready to control such incidents. If you look at the entirety of the country, the warlords keep their own areas somewhat protected in a situation of calm even though they keep the central authority at bay. What is left is basically Kabul and the southern provinces. The situation is now transiting towards the containment of violence and if there is success, then we might see the curtailing of a 30-year-old conflict.

Some death-bed options for Pakistan  55 13

Pakistan's ex-foreign secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan has just published his second book Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity (OUP 2011) and it is full of pointers about where we should we go as Pakistan stands on the brink of failing as a state. Riaz Mohammad Khan writes the following note on how Pakistan should proceed if it wants to survive: Riaz Mohammad Khan 'Pakistan's ambition to become a hub of economic activity would be difficult to materialise without the opening of transit routes to India. When the idea of activating the KKH for commerce with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was initiated by Pakistan in early 1993, the two countries were enthusiastic. The Kazakh minister for transportation convened a meeting and invited ambassadors from both Pakistan and India based in Alma Ata. He was disappointed to learn that India could not be included at that time, in view of tensions in relations between the two South Asian neighbours. The size of India's market creates the potential and generates interest to liven up prospects of overland transit'. Pakistan Army's options In August 2011, the big new development is a slight relaxation of our tight foreign policy towards India, obviously allowed by a hidden military think tank involving the ISI too. Before diplomacy in the Foreign Office abandoned its Kashmir scowl a bit, the ISPR said Pakistan should go ahead with trade with India; and that led to commerce secretaries saying nice things about the most favoured nation status that Pakistan has to give to India. The follow-up has allowed four days for cross-LoC trade as opposed to two in the past and hopefully the ISI will not choke it off again causing losses to innocent Azad Kashmiri traders. But what is most notable is the foreign ministers' different verbalisation about each other when they met recently in New Delhi. We need to un-tighten the policy sphincter a little more and get through trade what we will simply not get on such Foreign Office default preconditions as Kashmir, Sir Creek, Siachen, Wullar Barrage, etc. Sri Lanka feared Indian invasion but what did it do? It signed a free trade agreement. The peace dividend saw its economy grow at a rate that Pakistan envies. And it got rid of the Tamil terrorists without India minding it too much Pakistan Army should let foreign policy go. One says it because all armies attach foreign policy to geopolitics and therefore disqualify themselves as arbiters. They tie a most changeable category to the most unchanging physical aspect of the country where they imagine they see permanent advantage. Geopolitically, India is a permanent enemy. Geopolitically, Pakistan's median 'transit territory' status gives it permanent advantage. Nothing could be more wrong. A state is important because it is a 'connecting territory'. Other people pass through it to cut down on distances. Trade plied through it makes the commodities competitive in price. This means that the geographically important state has to develop its roadways and railways, and other infrastructure such as hotels, to facilitate those who wish to pass through. Once the geographically 'connective' state has become an effective corridor of passage, its importance is no doubt established. And the dividend of this importance comes in economic terms and through an absence of war. The bomb was not meant for war as most clerics think. It is good as a weapon of peace and for free-trading, and that is what Pakistan should do There are however two ways of looking at 'geopolitical importance'. One is the 'civilian' approach which is described above. The other is the 'military' approach which relies on geography as 'obstacle' rather than 'connection'. The military mind says: we are in the middle and we will not let you pass unless you agree to our terms. (To India, we say let's talk Kashmir before we talk free trade.) This is a masculine approach and doesn't allow penetration without first acquiring the dividend; the civilian approach allows penetration before acquiring the dividend. In the case of Pakistan, it is the military view of geopolitical importance that has held sway. The military view of Pakistan's geopolitical importance has been proved wrong by the failure of the theory of 'strategic depth' as a kind of corollary to our self-image as a geopolitical obstacle. As some textbooks recognise, the geopolitical view of international affairs is favoured by all armies because it is linked to geography and therefore is of fixed value. And it obviates the periodical rewriting of textbooks the army officers read during training. The only geography that works however is the one based on the civilian view: Finland could exploit its 'median' location during the Cold War while Pakistan could not. The advantage will materialise only after the trade route becomes functional and billions of international dollars become committed to it Today the civilian geopolitical advantage is a part of the war equation in South Asia. The military imagination is fixed on it as 'one time advantage': once a trade route is given to India, Pakistan will lose its upper hand. The fact is that the advantage will materialise only after the trade route becomes functional and billions of international dollars become committed to it. 'What Pakistan has to abandon is its 'strategic depth' approach to its neighbourhood. Ex-foreign secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan, who says he once questioned General Musharraf on the army's wrong thinking, has the following observation: 'Political analysts often point out that two considerations preoccupied Pakistan Army's strategic thinking relating to its support to various Afghan Mujahedin groups: first, a view of Afghanistan as providing strategic depth to Pakistan, and secondly, an interest in having a friendly government in Afghanistan. While the concept of a friendly government was flawed, the aspiration of strategic depth in Afghanistan defied reason from the point of view of the traditional interpretation of the concept. Friendly government is a highly subjective concept that encourages patronage and interference and spawns suspicion and provocation'. Pakistan government's options Retired army officers, and retired and serving diplomats, who get to write articles and appear on Pakistan's conservative TV networks, provide the explosive material for wrong policies that blow up in our faces. Riaz Mohammad Khan describes them in the following words: 'A siege mentality is also manifest in aggressive patriotism and narrow nationalism. The sentiment is especially evident among retired mid-level officials, both military and civilian, and religiously inclined middle-class citizens, who have imbibed suspicion towards the West, hostility towards India, and pride in a culture of patriotic self-righteousness typical of middle classes in many societies. This mentality induces further stress in an environment of anger, suspicion, dissension, and delusions in which extremist tendencies breed and thrive'. Pakistan is fast coming apart, existentially and in terms of thinking. The reason is the dwindling of factors that hold life together. The economy cannot be allowed to start growing through cheap money if law and order are not ensured. As people become unemployed through a shrinking of the economy, their inclination to vandalism and crime becomes not only possible but - to them - morally justified. The state is sliding to a halt. It cannot run the facilities it has inherited. It cannot guarantee the survival of those in the private sector. The first and last signature of the state - security of property rights - is fading. The writ of the state is gone in a large part of its territory and going in what is left. If the rupee slides through dollarisation and through hyper-inflation, the state may have to be labelled 'failed state'. What is to be done? So far, Pakistan is challenging the US on the basis of a thinking that weighs Pakistan heavier in the strategic scale, retired diplomats and generals saying America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America. Pakistan Army is fighting the terrorists in the Tribal Areas but also gets the civilian authorities to hound American diplomats as a sop to the Taliban and al Qaeda. It has no money to fight the terrorists with but hates the Americans doing the fighting for it. Is Pakistan simply creating chaos, in the words of the French scholar Olivier Roy? Is Pakistan Army creating chaos just because America wants to create order? The economists in Pakistan have finally disengaged themselves from the Pak Army and textbook thinking that India wants to occupy Pakistan and rule Muslims. They think that, while the world is suffering from economic crisis, two neighbours of Pakistan, China and India, are growing at high rates. They see Pakistan surviving only as a part of the South Asian economy. This doesn't mean Pakistan kowtowing to India. It doesn't mean Pakistan giving up Kashmir. It simply means Pakistan integrating with India and growing in tandem with it, taking in investment and benefiting from low wages, allowing India a land route to Central Asia, providing pipeline-fed gas to energy-starved India and letting people cross the Indian border under a liberal visa regime. After that Pak Army can turn around and take on the terrorists before they get to our nukes. Sri Lanka feared India and had a Tamil minority that took to terrorism to get their rights. There was the Tamilnadu state across the strait with 65 million Tamils to Sri Lanka's 24 million population. Sri Lanka feared Indian invasion but what did it do? It signed a free trade agreement - Pakistan has signed one too but not ratified it - and benefited from it. The peace dividend saw its economy grow at a rate that Pakistan envies. And it got rid of the Tamil terrorists without India minding it too much. Pakistan is different from India's other neighbours. It is a nuclear power. But the bomb Pakistan made was not meant for war as most clerics think. Pakistan cannot use the bomb for fighting India, as it did at Kargil. At war, it will be defeated as it was in 1971 and 1999. But the bomb is good as a weapon of peace and for free-trading, and that is what Pakistan should do. For counter-terrorism, Pakistan needs writ of the state and for that it needs to fight the terrorists. It is a circular argument. Pakistan needs friends who can give it the money it needs to fight terrorism. It is picking the wrong enemies in America, Europe, India and - if you insist - Israel. Comments (7 comments) My God shouldnt this be obvious to everyone! Posted: Wednesday, August 17, 2011 by Muhammad from Karachi Sir Khalid ahmad is always right and now authentication has been drawn from a reliable source...the book's author....as the latter has been close to the the government serving on an important post....terms are rich in conveying their meanings and much more......And yes....no one has a second opinion as far is the concern of the power imbalance in Pakistan and ultimately its consequences in the form being caught in the quagmire of the strategic depth and the conspiracy theories of yahoodee,hanoodee and taghootee forces...For Heaven Sake think with sense. Posted: Wednesday, August 17, 2011 by wazir from Pakistan You should study India Bangladesh trade before making a case for trade. I have looked at the numbers and it seems that India wants one way trade. Prove me wrong. Posted: Wednesday, August 17, 2011 by Parvez Mahmud from California I have a lot of respect for Mr Riaz Mohammad Khan as a professional diplomat and a man of mature vision and independent ideas.Having said that His out right rejection of every one elses point of view by categorising it into some totally incompetent and flawed minds and a self righteous mindset to carry the arguements is too simplistic for a serious readers liking.Hard realities cannot be ignored and to give an impression that someone in Pakistan should be willingly creating enemies to fight is downright flawed and trying to please a certain audience.Economic benifits and trade are very important but so is the respect and security of a state.Why should we alternately prefer a hostile Afghanistan and it shouldnt concern us and the concept of strategic depth as being put forward to ridicule its advocates is totally flawed and a self serving argument.We need to be friendly to all and help US help us win our war against our enemies but not by keeping us in the dark by who are doing it ,and what all are they doing in OUR Country .What somebody does in Afghanistan or India or else where they could and ideally should share if they consider us as allies but what they do in Pakistan they need not only share but coordinate with us and we should retain the right to veto because that is how all independent and self respecting states do business with others even in tiny countries like Singapore and Brunei. Posted: Saturday, August 13, 2011 by sallahuddin satti from Brunei Darussalam Pakistan is viewed as a blackmailing thug with nuclear capabilities. It has failed to develop the right resources for it's survival, and strategic planning without resources is HALLUCINATION! Time is approaching to carefully isolate and save, salvageable and manageable portions of Pakistan. Hopefully these parts will coexist with the rest of humanity. Posted: Saturday, August 13, 2011 by Dr Patel from sailing somewhere in Carribian An interesting set of ideas which are fresh. They deserve to be examined closely. What I believe left out in this analysis is the role that the Saudi-Gulf rulers have played in the last two decades to foment trouble in South Asia through instigating terrorism. India and Pakistan together can sort out these meddlesome rulers! Posted: Friday, August 12, 2011 by Kumar Venkatraman from Hyderabad India Very bold and new thinking. If Pak becomes a failed state, only its political leaders need to be blamed. People repeatedly voted for a democratic government, but the ruling elite never deliver goods to people. There are lot of hard-working people there and all they want is prosperity and normalcy in life. Posted: Friday, August 12, 2011 by Shawn Reddy from USA

Afghan operational consensus needed

Recently the American society of psychology came to two conclusions, one that in most of the cases the problems are of social nature which are diagnosed as psychiatric pre conditions, secondly the children require attention for their tantrum. After coming so far still the knowledge is lacking in tackling the basic questions. This also leads to the fact that technology and advancement has its limit and it frequently returns to basics whenever faced with difficult situations. Uncle Sam needs to have a lesson that whatever strategy or philosophy is applied, the basics is the essentials. Afghanistan has now become a test case for USA. The End Game is actually the beginning, the players are poised a fresh for a new round of fierce struggle or a political tent pegging, the horse, rider and the game all three are lined up for the final round up. Players are well defined but goals as elusive as the morning mist.

Three assertions have changed the complete paradox to new paradoxical heights, one, Hillary Clinton said that Ayman-el-Zawahiri is likely hiding in Pakistan, second American Senators are coming up for fresh demands to harness Pakistan’s security set up specially in supporting Haqqani net work, thirdly another Haqqani, the professor from Boston is asking terse question from Pakistani state about its strategic policy options, just moments back he himself was part of everything albeit quixotically. Afghanistan end game is approaching, rather is around the corner. The relations between USA and Pakistan is at the lowest ebb. These have not come to this pass ever. Probably for the first time both are at different pages but the book is same so with little prudent measures the damage control can be done before both start reading the different chronicles(with page theory gone).

The end game has also gone little complex, Obama inked a new agreement with Afghanistan ,ensuring the presence of American experts even when the troops leave after 2014, the Bigram, Kandahar and Kabul bases will remain operational much beyond the projected time line. The end game is actually the finale crescendo of the new great game song. The geography has gain further importance when now the cartographic phase of the great game is approaching. Tribal areas of Pakistan, the adjoining areas of Afghanistan, the territory south of Bahawalpur Slope till Gwader and the Indian Ocean are all linked to the end game of Afghanistan. Robert Kaplan in his latest book “Monsoon” defined the theater of new great game by highlighting the importance of Indian Ocean after the diminishing one of the Atlantic or Pacific etc.

The littoral powers are in for the dawn of a new competitive era. The most important question or the political anchorage is the opening of NATO supply or the GLOC. The mathematics on both sides need bold corrections, Pakistani intelligentsia made the people believe that the western troops in Afghanistan will not be able to sustain this blockade for more than a month and will come running and begging for clemency in technical terms, specially on Salala and Drones etc.

But this did not happen, the NDN (northern distribution network) and ALOC (air line of communication) sustained the same for over five months. There are still no dents visible although Russia has reservations but is not in position to make sounds beyond egoistic whimpers. The American side also miscalculated the response of Pakistan by taking it for granted on illegal incursions and sans sovereignty acts of an imperial power by virtue of regal hubris. Now both, the Pakistan and USA have corrected the wrong by taking a prudent stance on NATO supply route. Pakistan could not ignore Chicago summit being an important platform and also Afghanistan specific. Pakistan has just shown necessary roughness while dealing with USA in past few months. It is precisely required in any relationship, may it be husband and wife or Hillary’s favorite mother in law analogy. So it should only be taken in the right context, Pakistan just showed a tinge of essential roughness in retaliation to its bashing; it was never an act of insolence towards international community. Pakistan is not a rentier state, the state policy could be loop sided but it does exist. It is both a victim and the player of the new great game with a status of the regional middle kingdom. Afghanistan end game is being played by increasing the numbers of players at its final hour; this has made the complete phenomenon global in nature and multi dimensional in its texture.

The ground realities in Afghanistan cannot be ignored, the ANA (afghan national army) is now over one lakh strong and is going to be a force of projected strength of three lakhs. Being the guarantor of peace whence the foreign troops leave, they are supposed to be well trained and well oriented towards the main objective of maintaining peace. Less about 30 percent the afghan army is rather hastily trained and prematurely poised to undertake difficult operations. Pakistan is pursuing the policy of constructive engagement, all players and stake holders have come a pass from where mere politics and petite responses are no more an option. A concrete set of measures are required to solve the Afghan problem, the comprehensive approach covering complete ambit of Pashtun society is the answer. Blame game by Karazai against Pakistan or the controlled tantrums of USA towards Pakistan can lead no one anywhere.

Americans are there to stay and so does the two geographical neighbors. From Boon to Chicago the journey is made and history written but the question is, that can Pakistan be ignored with its unique connectivity matrix. Pakistan is fighting an extended insurgency in the complete tribal areas. Globalism has come face to face with tribalism, one using the technology as the main driver and later using the simplicity as the sin-qua-non for its existence and survival. International conferences, moots and summits without reality checks will result into a futile exercise and the perpetuation of Afghan ordeals. Protagonists, i.e. Pakistan, Afghanistan and USA have to reach an operational consensus respecting each other’s sensitivities. Time is ripe for the harvest of century and the windfall of hope, promise and prosperity. 

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=157291

REEMA KHAN'S WALIMA 26 May 2012

REEMA KHAN'S WALIMA 26 May 2012

Reema was Married to dr tariq shahab six months back in united states,then reema said that walima will be held in my hometown Lahore,now as you all see today on news channels about the reports of reema's walimma which was held in Lahore pearl continental hotel.it was complimentary walima specially arranged by PC hotel management on their own expanse for gorgeous Pakistani actress.its a simple walima reception with only one dish and its on request of reema.PC hotel also decorate a room for the couple.there is also a special security arrangements to avoid any unpleasant situation.Reema's Walima dress is designs by pakistani famous designer hassan shaheryar yaseen(HSY).we will upload More walima reception pictures and video soon

Cartoon

Indian elephant, Chinese tiger

Humayun Gauhar

What a silly storm in a small Indian teacup. We should be looking at the Chinese teacup. Obama goes to India to get something, flatters to sell by saying what the Indians wish to hear and the sated go ape. The wretched of the earth could not give a fig. They want food. Flattery is marketing, my dear compatriots, it’s all marketing. Those who fall for it soon come a cropper. There’s no gainsaying that the Indians fell for such crass K&F – kowtowing and flattery.

Obama went to India with two objectives:

1. To get orders for US products to help kick start his economy and create jobs in his country. For this he offered India some lollipops that may not get past the new Congress.

2. To send China the message that the great USA is standing in India’s corner. China has been turning up the heat on India since early last year.

Should Obama have come to Pakistan too? Certainly not. Better this than the disgraceful six-hour Clinton visit, when he closed down our capital, changed the airport-to-city road to the wrong side, refused to be photographed with our president, lectured our chief justice at a luncheon not to hang Nawaz Sharif (no one was going to hang him anyway) and then had the gall to lecture us too. More to the point, we let him do all it.

America has now lumped Pakistan with Afghanistan, Iran and the Central Asian Republics, not South Asia. That’s their business. It’s their way of looking at things. Lumping on the basis of strategic considerations is clearer than lumping according to geographical convenience.

Is China quaking? Obama has climbed the back of an Indian elephant to kill the Chinese tiger. China can appear in many incarnations. It can also become an ant – who is better at guerilla warfare? An ant is like a guerilla that climbs up an elephant’s trunk and drives it crazy, until it is dead. Those who are riding it fall off and are crushed by the elephant or eaten when the ant reincarnates itself as a tiger. America should know this, if nothing else from Vietnam and Korea. If it still doesn’t, sheer need for survival will, hopefully, make it understand. Obama’s India visit should be viewed in this context.

We are in the throes of that rare seminal change that is caused by the collapse of a World Order. The period of transition turns order into disorder. The usual catalyst is acute financial strain caused by military misadventures that throw up internal contradictions long hidden beneath the surface. Stability returns only when a new order has been painfully forged with global and regional power shifting wholly or partially elsewhere, only to go again with the next great flux. Such is the ebb and flow of world power.

Today’s flux is greater than those caused in the aftermath of the two World Wars with the Great Depression thrown in between. The map of Europe changed after both. Power shifted from a tired Europe to a budding United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, with the latter drawing down what Churchill called the ‘Iron Curtain’, resulting in the ‘Cold War’. The US became a new kind of superpower, largely without conquest and direct control – colonization without responsibility. We saw the advent of consensual rather than coercive hegemony. Instead of conquering and occupying territory (until Afghanistan and Iraq) like the European colonizers had done and the Soviets were still doing, America won world market shares and influence not only through great international marketing but more via economic domination by making countries indebted to it and its institutions. Countries always faced the threat of being left out in the cold (sanctions) – the redoubtable carrot and stick policy rather than the European Divide and Rule doctrine.

America had learned well the lessons imparted by two of its early presidents. George Washington realized that America had fought its War of Independence against the British with British weapons. This was unacceptable. He set America on the course of producing its own arms and ammunition, and later marketing some often through the old gunrunner turned ‘agent’. No country was sovereign unless it was self-sufficient in defense. Quincy Adams declared that hegemony could be achieved by force or by making countries indebted – that was the advent of consensual hegemony. Loans were given to create a false dawn of growth. Countries forgot the obvious doctrine of self-reliance. Loans became drugs and the countries became completely dependent on them, junkies at the mercy of the drug peddler and his touts. You see the results today. After the demise of the Gold Standard and the illusion of the ‘mighty dollar’ as the benchmark currency of exchange, America’s headiness made it forget this cardinal principle and it became dangerously indebted to China. You see the results of that too today.

The Cold War was the Third World War, with the world largely divided between the US and the Soviet Blocs. And just as WWI became a new kind of war with the first-time use of aerial power and WWII with nuclear bombs, the Cold War was a new kind of war fought neither by conventional nor nuclear weapons but by the threat of the use of them. Like all wars, it too was about the control of world market shares and access to cheap labour, raw materials and markets made captive by economic dependence caused by increasing indebtedness to the US and its instruments. Proof lies in the fact that not one developing country has come out of the pejorative Third World category because of the Bretton Woods institutions. The Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union and the US acquiring the mantle of sole superpower.

From 1990, we saw the dawn of a uni-polar world. It had to be brief. Unable to function outside an adversarial framework, America saw enemies where there were none. Instead, it chose to become the global bully led for eight years by the global village idiot. We then saw the advent of the Fourth World War with the events of 9/11, which is also a new kind of war. America has all but lost it in Afghanistan and is dangerously dependent on Pakistan to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.

Only one country remained outside the two main superpower blocs during the Cold War, its strength coming from its strong ideology. That was China. And it is China and only China that is emerging as the new superpower, to share global power and influence with a diminished United States. Whether it leads to another US-China Cold War remains to be seen, but if it does it will be a war America cannot win. I therefore hope that America realizes that it can extract greater mileage if it works with China. That will require an extraordinary leap of maturity on its part, something that has been lacking since it acquired superpower status. It may be forced to learn now, since I find it difficult to accept that it won’t realize that in an adversarial relationship with China it will be the ultimate loser. Both have a cooperative relationship with one another because right now both are dangerously dependent on one another. Andreas Lorenz calls this new possible relationship ‘The Rise of Chimerica’.

Now with another economic crisis triggered by the Afghan and Iraq wars, the uni-polar world is giving way to a multi-polar world as power shifts from West to East, from the US to China. The new Great Powers will have to again carve out the world into spheres of influence as they did in Yalta after World War II. To survive, America will have to share global power with China, and with Russia and perhaps Germany too getting some share of the pie. That could happen in Shanghai under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with perhaps a new global currency, something new as benchmark and a new United Nations. Where does India come into this equation – or for that matter and the so-called ‘Muslim World’?

Comment: It will indeed be helpful if the Pakistanis would be looking at the Chinese tea cup and not at the silly Indian tea cup,  but the problem is the Pakistani Army's fatal ( or convenient  ??) obsession with India.  All India needs now is a Pakistani nation in denial ……….. ignoring India would be even better ……… !!!

It is an absolute lie to state that China was neutral in the cold war between the NATO block and the Soviets.  China was very much against the Soviets and fought its border war with Russia during that time. China utilized the cold war to its maximum benefit, that resulted in massive western investments and its economic transformation.   
As it stands now, not even the Americans deny that the days of unipolar world is over, and there will be power sharing in a multipolar environment in the years ahead.  There is also no denying that China would emerge as an economic superpower.  But that does not take away the fact that the US will continue to be the single most powerful nation for the foreseeable future. Stealing and copying will not make China a military superpower anytime soon.
Yourself,  like the rest of the world, are eager to see the cards India holds. But India has no reason to rush, and show its cards at this point of time. Your question regarding India's position in a new world order has its answer in the trend, which shows that India would emerge as the swing power. 
The Muslim world shares all the traits of authoritarian, undemocratic and expansionist China, and therefore has a natural ally in China. However Pakistan might not find the prosperous Muslim nations to openly join the Chinese band wagon.