Suleiman: The CIA's man in Cairo

Suleiman, a friend to the US and reported torturer, has long been touted as a presidential successor.

On January 29, Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s top spy chief, was anointed vice president by tottering dictator, Hosni Mubarak. By appointing Suleiman, part of a shake-up of the cabinet in an attempt to appease the masses of protesters and retain his own grip on the presidency, Mubarak has once again shown his knack for devilish shrewdness. Suleiman has long been favoured by the US government for his ardent anti-Islamism, his willingness to talk and act tough on Iran - and he has long been the CIA’s main man in Cairo.

Mubarak knew that Suleiman would command an instant lobby of supporters at Langley and among 'Iran nexters' in Washington - not to mention among other authoritarian mukhabarat-dependent regimes in the region. Suleiman is a favourite of Israel too; he held the Israel dossier and directed Egypt’s efforts to crush Hamas by demolishing the tunnels that have functioned as a smuggling conduit for both weapons and foodstuffs into Gaza.

According to a WikiLeak(ed) US diplomatic cable, titled 'Presidential Succession in Egypt', dated May 14, 2007:

"Egyptian intelligence chief and Mubarak consigliere, in past years Soliman was often cited as likely to be named to the long-vacant vice-presidential post. In the past two years, Soliman has stepped out of the shadows, and allowed himself to be photographed, and his meetings with foreign leaders reported. Many of our contacts believe that Soliman, because of his military background, would at least have to figure in any succession scenario."

From 1993 until Saturday, Suleiman was chief of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service. He remained largely in the shadows until 2001, when he started taking over powerful dossiers in the foreign ministry; he has since become a public figure, as the WikiLeak document attests. In 2009, he was touted by the London Telegraph and Foreign Policy as the most powerful spook in the region, topping even the head of Mossad.

In the mid-1990s, Suleiman worked closely with the Clinton administration in devising and implementing its rendition program; back then, rendition involved kidnapping suspected terrorists and transferring them to a third country for trial. In The Dark Side, Jane Mayer describes how the rendition program began:

"Each rendition was authorised at the very top levels of both governments [the US and Egypt] ... The long-serving chief of the Egyptian central intelligence agency, Omar Suleiman, negotiated directly with top [CIA] officials. [Former US Ambassador to Egypt Edward] Walker described the Egyptian counterpart, Suleiman, as 'very bright, very realistic', adding that he was cognisant that there was a downside to 'some of the negative things that the Egyptians engaged in, of torture and so on. But he was not squeamish, by the way'. (p. 113).

"Technically, US law required the CIA to seek 'assurances' from Egypt that rendered suspects wouldn't face torture. But under Suleiman's reign at the EGIS, such assurances were considered close to worthless. As Michael Scheuer, a former CIA officer [head of the al-Qaeda desk], who helped set up the practise of rendition, later testified, even if such 'assurances' were written in indelible ink, 'they weren't worth a bucket of warm spit'."

Under the Bush administration, in the context of "the global war on terror", US renditions became "extraordinary", meaning the objective of kidnapping and extra-legal transfer was no longer to bring a suspect to trial - but rather for interrogation to seek actionable intelligence. The extraordinary rendition program landed some people in CIA black sites - and others were turned over for torture-by-proxy to other regimes. Egypt figured large as a torture destination of choice, as did Suleiman as Egypt’s torturer-in-chief. At least one person extraordinarily rendered by the CIA to Egypt — Egyptian-born Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib — was reportedly tortured by Suleiman himself.

Suleiman the torturer

In October 2001, Habib was seized from a bus by Pakistani security forces. While detained in Pakistan, at the behest of American agents, he was suspended from a hook and electrocuted repeatedly. He was then turned over to the CIA, and in the process of transporting him to Egypt he endured the usual treatment: his clothes were cut off, a suppository was stuffed in his anus, he was put into a diaper - and 'wrapped up like a spring roll'.

In Egypt, as Habib recounts in his memoir, My Story: The Tale of a Terrorist Who Wasn’t, he was repeatedly subjected to electric shocks, immersed in water up to his nostrils and beaten. His fingers were broken and he was hung from metal hooks. At one point, his interrogator slapped him so hard that his blindfold was dislodged, revealing the identity of his tormentor: Suleiman.

Frustrated that Habib was not providing useful information or confessing to involvement in terrorism, Suleiman ordered a guard to murder a shackled prisoner in front of Habib, which he did with a vicious karate kick. In April 2002, after five months in Egypt, Habib was rendered to American custody at Bagram prison in Afghanistan - and then transported to Guantanamo. On January 11, 2005, the day before he was scheduled to be charged, Dana Priest of the Washington Post published an exposé about Habib’s torture. The US government immediately announced that he would not be charged and would be repatriated to Australia.

A far more infamous torture case, in which Suleiman also is directly implicated, is that of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi. Unlike Habib, who was innocent of any ties to terror or militancy, al-Libi was allegedly a trainer at al-Khaldan camp in Afghanistan. He was captured by the Pakistanis while fleeing across the border in November 2001. He was sent to Bagram, and questioned by the FBI. But the CIA wanted to take over, which they did, and he was transported to a black site on the USS Bataan in the Arabian Sea, then extraordinarily rendered to Egypt. Under torture there, al-Libi "confessed" knowledge about an al-Qaeda–Saddam connection, claiming that two al-Qaeda operatives had received training in Iraq for use in chemical and biological weapons. In early 2003, this was exactly the kind of information that the Bush administration was seeking to justify attacking Iraq and to persuade reluctant allies to go along. Indeed, al-Libi’s "confession" was one the central pieces of "evidence" presented at the United Nations by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell to make the case for war.

As it turns out, that confession was a lie tortured out of him by Egyptians. Here is how former CIA chief George Tenet describes the whole al-Libi situation in his 2007 memoir, At The Center Of The Storm:

"We believed that al-Libi was withholding critical threat information at the time, so we transferred him to a third country for further debriefing. Allegations were made that we did so knowing that he would be tortured, but this is false. The country in question [Egypt] understood and agreed that they would hold al-Libi for a limited period. In the course of questioning while he was in US custody in Afghanistan, al-Libi made initial references to possible al-Qa'ida training in Iraq. He offered up information that a militant known as Abu Abdullah had told him that at least three times between 1997 and 2000, the now-deceased al-Qa'ida leader Mohammad Atef had sent Abu Abdullah to Iraq to seek training in poisons and mustard gas.

"Another senior al-Qa'ida detainee told us that Mohammad Atef was interested in expanding al-Qa'ida's ties to Iraq, which, in our eyes, added credibility to the reporting. Then, shortly after the Iraq war got under way, al-Libi recanted his story. Now, suddenly, he was saying that there was no such cooperative training. Inside the CIA, there was sharp division on his recantation. It led us to recall his reporting, and here is where the mystery begins.

"Al-Libi's story will no doubt be that he decided to fabricate in order to get better treatment and avoid harsh punishment. He clearly lied. We just don't know when. Did he lie when he first said that al-Qa'ida members received training in Iraq - or did he lie when he said they did not? In my mind, either case might still be true. Perhaps, early on, he was under pressure, assumed his interrogators already knew the story, and sang away. After time passed and it became clear that he would not be harmed, he might have changed his story to cloud the minds of his captors. Al-Qa'ida operatives are trained to do just that. A recantation would restore his stature as someone who had successfully confounded the enemy. The fact is, we don't know which story is true, and since we don't know, we can assume nothing. (pp. 353-354)"

Al-Libi was eventually sent off, quietly, to Libya - though he reportedly made a few other stops along the way - where he was imprisoned. The use of al-Libi’s statement in the build-up to the Iraq war made him a huge American liability once it became clear that the purported al-Qaeda–Saddam connection was a tortured lie. His whereabouts were, in fact, a secret for years, until April 2009 when Human Rights Watch researchers investigating the treatment of Libyan prisoners encountered him in the courtyard of a prison. Two weeks later, on May 10, al-Libi was dead, and the Gaddafi regime claimed it was a suicide.

According to Evan Kohlmann, who enjoys favoured status among US officials as an 'al-Qaeda expert', citing a classified source: 'Al-Libi’s death coincided with the first visit by Egypt’s spymaster Omar Suleiman to Tripoli.'

Kohlmann surmises and opines that, after al-Libi recounted his story about about an al-Qaeda–Saddam-WMD connection, "The Egyptians were embarassed by this admission - and the Bush government found itself in hot water internationally. Then, in May 2009, Omar Suleiman saw an opportunity to get even with al-Libi and travelled to Tripoli. By the time Omar Suleiman’s plane left Tripoli, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi had committed 'suicide'."

As people in Egypt and around the world speculate about the fate of the Mubarak regime, one thing should be very clear: Omar Suleiman is not the man to bring democracy to the country. His hands are too dirty, and any 'stability' he might be imagined to bring to the country and the region comes at way too high a price. Hopefully, the Egyptians who are thronging the streets and demanding a new era of freedom will make his removal from power part of their demands, too.

Lisa Hajjar teaches sociology at the University of California - Santa Barbara and is a co-editor of Jadaliyya.

Egypt: Current History

New Era Dawns in Egypt and Across the Arab World

A new era dawned in Egypt on Saturday as this nation of 80 million — and hundreds of millions beyond its borders — began to absorb the fact that an 18-day mass movement of nonviolent protest brought down a 30-year military dictatorship and renewed the country’s lease on life.

Thousands lent a hand to a volunteer clean-up of Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the new Egypt. Sanitation trucks deployed on its outskirts and soldiers removed some of the barricades surrounding the square. The protest organizers had said they would leave it up to people whether to stay or go, and a small group on Saturday seemed intent on staying, for now, saying they wanted President Hosni Mubarak to return to Egypt, to be tried.

“The People Overthrew the Regime,” read the headline in Al-Ahram, the flagship state-owned national newspaper and former government mouthpiece, borrowing a line from the protest movement. Another article noted that Switzerland had frozen the assets of Mr. Mubarak, the president driven from office, and those of his aides.

Al Arabiya television said the army, now in charge, would soon suspend parliament and dismiss the cabinet. The head of the Constitutional Court would join the military council in its temporary leadership role, it said.

People across the Arab world celebrated the end of dictatorship in the largest Arab country after a similar event in Tunisia last month but it was less clear if they would be able to follow their examples. In Algeria, where an anti-government demonstration had been called, only several dozen protesters arrived in the center of the capital and were met by hundreds of police in riot gear, Reuters reported from Algiers.

In Egypt, the army leadership was contemplating its first steps. Mr. Mubarak, an 82-year-old former air force commander, left without comment for his home by the Red Sea in Sharm el Sheik. His departure overturns, after six decades, the Arab world’s original secular dictatorship. He was toppled by a radically new force in regional politics — a largely secular, nonviolent, youth-led democracy movement that brought Egypt’s liberal and Islamist opposition groups together for the first time under its banner.

One by one the protesters withstood each weapon in the arsenal of the Egyptian autocracy — first the heavily armed riot police, then a ruling party militia and finally the state’s powerful propaganda machine.

Mr. Mubarak’s fall removed a bulwark of American foreign policy in the region. The United States, its Arab allies and Israel are now pondering whether the Egyptian military, which has vowed to hold free elections, will give way to a new era of democratic dynamism or to a perilous lurch into instability or Islamist rule.

The upheaval comes less than a month after a sudden youth revolt in nearby Tunisia toppled another enduring Arab strongman, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. And on Friday night some of the revelers celebrating in the streets of Cairo marched under a Tunisian flag and pointed to the surviving autocracies in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen. “We are setting a role model for the dictatorships around us,” said Khalid Shaheen, 39. “Democracy is coming.”

President Obama, in a televised address, praised the Egyptian revolution. “Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine democracy will carry the day,” he said. “It was the moral force of nonviolence — not terrorism and mindless killing — that bent the arc of history toward justice once more.”

The Muslim Brotherhood, the outlawed Islamist movement that until 18 days ago was considered Egypt’s only viable opposition, said it was merely a supporting player in the revolt.

“We participated with everyone else and did not lead this or raise Islamic slogans so that it can be the revolution of everyone,” said Mohamed Saad el-Katatni, a spokesman for the Brotherhood. “This is a revolution for all Egyptians; there is no room for a single group’s slogans, not the Brotherhood’s or anybody else.”

The Brotherhood, which was slow to follow the lead of its own youth wing into the streets, has said it will not field a candidate for president or seek a parliamentary majority in the expected elections.

The Mubarak era ended without any of the stability and predictability that were the hallmarks of his tenure. Western and Egyptian officials had expected Mr. Mubarak to leave office on Thursday and irrevocably delegate his authority to Vice President Suleiman, finishing the last six months of his term with at least his presidential title intact.

But whether because of pride or stubbornness, Mr. Mubarak instead spoke once again as the unbowed father of the nation, barely alluding to a vague “delegation” of authority.

The resulting disappointment enraged the Egyptian public, sent a million people into the streets of Cairo on Friday morning and put in motion an unceremonious retreat at the behest of the military he had commanded for so long.

“Taking into consideration the difficult circumstances the country is going through, President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak has decided to leave the post of president of the republic and has tasked the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to manage the state’s affairs,” Mr. Suleiman, grave and ashen, said in a brief televised statement.

It is now not clear what role Mr. Suleiman, whose credibility plummeted over the past week as he stood by Mr. Mubarak and even questioned Egypt’s readiness for democracy, will have in the new government.

The transfer of power leaves the Egyptian military in charge of this nation of 85 million, facing insistent calls for fundamental democratic change and open elections. Hours before Mr. Suleiman announced Mr. Mubarak’s exit, the military had signaled its takeover with a communiqué that appeared to declare its solidarity with the protesters.

Read on state television by an army spokesman, the communiqué declared that the military — not Mr. Mubarak, Mr. Suleiman or any other civilian authority — would ensure the amendment of the Constitution to “conduct free and fair presidential elections.”

“The armed forces are committed to sponsor the legitimate demands of the people,” the statement declared, and the military promised to ensure the fulfillment of its promises “within defined time frames” until authority could be passed to a “free democratic community that the people aspire to.”

It pledged to remove the reviled “emergency law,” which allows the government to detain anyone without charges or trial, “as soon as the current circumstances are over” and further promised immunity from prosecution for the protesters, whom it called “the honest people who refused the corruption and demanded reforms.”

Egyptians ignored the communiqué, as they have most official pronouncements of the Mubarak government, until the president’s resignation was announced. Then they hugged, kissed and cheered the soldiers, lifting children on tanks to get their pictures taken. “The people and the army are one hand,” they chanted.

Standing guard near the presidential palace, soldiers passed photographs of “martyrs” killed during the revolution through barbed wire to attach them to their tanks. At Tahrir Square, some slipped out of position to join the roaring crowds flooding the streets.

Whether the military will subordinate itself to a civilian democracy or install a new military dictator will be impossible to know for months. Military leaders will inevitably face pressure to deliver the genuine transition that protesters did not trust Mr. Mubarak to give them.

Yet it may also seek to protect the enormous political and economic privileges it accumulated during Mr. Mubarak’s reign. And the army has itself been infused for years with the notion that Egypt’s survival depends on fighting threats, real and imagined, from foreign enemies, Islamists, Iran and the frustrations of its own people.

Throughout the revolt, the army stood passively on the sidelines — its soldiers literally standing behind the iron fence of the Egyptian Museum — as the police or armed Mubarak loyalists fought the protesters centered in Tahrir Square.

But Western diplomats, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they were violating confidences, said that top army officials had told them that their troops would never use force against civilians, depriving Mr. Mubarak of a decisive tool to suppress the dissent.

It has been “increasingly clear,” a Western diplomat said Friday, that “the army will not go down with Mubarak.”

Now the military, which owns vast commercial interests here but has not fought in decades, must defuse demonstrations, quell widespread labor unrest and rebuild a shattered economy and security forces. Its top official, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, 75, served for decades as a top official of Mr. Mubarak’s government. And its top uniformed official, Gen. Sami Hafez Enan, has not spoken publicly.

Egypt’s opposition has said for weeks that it welcomed a military role in securing the country, ideally under a two- to five-member presidential council with only one military member. And the initial reaction to the military takeover was ecstatic.

“Welcome back,” said Wael Ghonim, the Google executive who administered the Facebook group that helped start the revolt.

Mr. Ghonim, who was detained for 12 days in blindfolded isolation by the Mubarak government as it tried to stamp out the revolt, helped protesters turn the tide in a propaganda war against the state media earlier this week, when he described his captivity in an emotional interview on a satellite television station.

“Egypt is going to be a democratic state,” he declared Friday, in another interview. “You will be impressed.”

Dr. Shady el-Ghazaly Harb, 32, a transplant surgeon who was among the small group of organizers who guided the revolution, said the leaders had decided to let the protests unwind on their own. “We are not going to ask the people to stay in the square or leave — it is their choice,” he said. “Even if they leave, any government will know that we can get them to the streets again in a minute.”

“Our country never had a victory in our lifetime, and this is the sort of victory we were looking for, a victory over a vicious regime that we needed to bring down,” Dr. Harb said.

Amr Ezz, 27, another of revolt’s young leaders, said that calling the revolution a military coup understated its achievement. “It is the people who took down the president and the regime and can take down anyone else,” he said. “Now the role of the regular people has ended and the role of the politicians begins. Now we can begin negotiations with the military in order to plan the coming phase.”

The opposition groups participating in the protest movement had previously settled on a committee led by Mohamed ElBaradei, the former diplomat and Nobel laureate, to negotiate with the army if Mr. Mubarak resigned.

Mr. ElBaradei could not be reached for comment on Friday, but in a television interview he indicated that he expected the talks with the military to begin within days.

“I’d like to see that started tomorrow so we can have a sharing of power, the civilian and the military, and tell them what our demands are, what they need to do,” he said.

By evening, Egyptian politicians were beginning to position themselves to run for office. Amr Moussa, one of the country’s most popular public figures, resigned his position as secretary general of the Arab League, and an aide, Hesham Youssef, confirmed that Mr. Moussa was considering seeking office.

In Switzerland, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had frozen possible assets of “the former Egyptian president” and his associates.

In the military’s final communiqué of the day, its spokesman thanked Mr. Mubarak for his service and saluted the “martyrs” of the revolution.

In Tahrir Square, protesters said they were not quite ready to disband the little republic they had built up during their two-week occupation, setting up makeshift clinics, soundstages, a detention center and security teams to protect the barricades.

Many have boasted that their encampment was a rare example of community spirit here, and after Mr. Mubarak’s resignation the organizers called on the thousands who protested here to return once again on Saturday morning to help clean it up.

Protests in Egypt day by day
Violent clashes between anti-government protestors and those loyal to President Hosni Mubarak escalated Thursday, and dozens of foreign journalists and aid workers were arrested.
Cairo's Tahrir Square has been the epicenter of the protests.

Tuesday Jan. 25
Inspired by the fall of Tunisia's longtime dictator, thousands flock to the streets in Cairo and other major Egyptian cities to denounce Mubarak's rule.
Wednesday Jan. 26
Demonstrations continue despite a government ban. Police use tear gas, clubs and rubber bullets against the crowds.
Thursday Jan. 27
Mohamed ElBaradei, an opposition activist and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, arrives in Cairo.
Friday Jan. 28
Clashes with police intensify, and deaths are reported. Overnight, the police are withdrawn and replaced with the military. The government institutes a curfew and blocks Internet access.
Saturday Jan. 29
Mubarak announces he is removing his cabinet and appoints a vice president. Protesters in Tahrir Square defy the curfew, and prison breaks and looting are reported throughout the weekend.
Sunday Jan. 30
ElBaradei is chosen as the opposition’s negotiator with the government but receives a lukewarm response when he speaks in Tahrir Square. The Obama administration calls for an "orderly transition" to an interim government until new elections are held.
Monday Jan. 31
Vice President Omar Suleiman says he will talk with opposition leaders. A calmer police force returns to the streets, and the army announces that it will not fire against the crowds.
Tuesday Feb. 1
More than 200,000 people peacefully gather in Tahrir Square. They vow to remain until Mubarak steps down and are not appeased by his promise not to run for reelection.
Wednesday Feb. 2
The peace that prevailed in Tahrir Square during Tuesday's massive demonstrations gives way to a standoff between pro-democracy demonstrators and thousands of Mubarak supporters. Internet access is restored.
Thursday Feb. 3
Violent clashes continue, and dozens of foreign journalists and human rights workers are taken into custody. On state television, Vice President Suleiman asks for patience from the people and rejects their plea for Mubarak to step down.
Friday Feb. 4
Hundreds of thousands of anti-Mubarak demonstrators gather in a calmer Tahrir Square on what they have called the "Day of Departure." They are joined by Arab League secretary general Amr Moussa, a possible replacement for ElBaradei as the leader of the opposition.

Pakistan and the Egyptian revolution

From the Early Dynastic Period before 3000 BC through to the end of the Ptolemaic Dynasty, when Egypt became a province of Rome under Augustus Caesar in 30 BC, Egypt has had many Pharaohs. From Hephaistos to Isiris (who also rose from the dead like Jesus, amazingly after three days) the people of the Nile have suffered in servitude and slavery. Each departure was heralded as a new beginning. From Ka to Khafra most Egyptians have suffered in dilapidating penury. From Kheperkare Nekhtnebef to Ramses, to Tut to Cleopatra to the French colonialism, and people of Al-Qahira have suffered. The departure of one Pharaoh simply brings about another one.

King of Egypt Farouk was born in 1920. In 1938, two years after the death of his father, King Fu’ad, Farouk ousted the Wafd government led by Nashas Pasha. King Farouk who had the largest pornographic collection of books int he world was steeped deep into hedonism. He miserably failed at his feeble attempts at half-hearted reform. His corrupt and ineffectual reign came to an end after he lost the support of the military after Egypt’s poor showing in its 1948 war with Israel. In 1952 King Farouq was forced to abdicate after a military coup led by Gamal Nasser.

The uprising against Farouq led them into the Socialist cul de sac which kept Egypt enslaved under the Nasserties. All of these Demi-Gods opposed the real representatives of the people. Hasn Al Banya and Syed Qutub have been declared bad and evil doers. Mubarak to the very last is depicting himself as the last wall against chaos and an Islamic takeover. It is the same line that Marcos used against the communists, and Allande used against the Marxists.

The death of Nasser and the murder of Sadaat were all heralded as the new dawn.

The French revolution against the monarchy in the ended coroneted another king. As often happens in third world countries, the revolutions bring about other dictators who commit the same mistakes. The beguiled Egyptians revolted against the Ottomans and got straddled with British colonialism and eventually King Farouq.

This current disaster on the Nile was manufactured in Washington–and the world may have to pay a heavy price for it. An overwhelming majority of the Egyptians have repeatedly voted for their representatives (guess who they are??)–to be over-run by one of the most brutal regimes in the Middle East. The Egyptians have endured 30 years of the current tin-pot and 15 years of the previous one—and America has kept them in place–or they would have been put on the wayside a long time ago.

Now we are giving them Mr. Sulaiman–asked him to create a VP slot and put the head of the dreaded Mukhabarat (intelligence Services which would put Savak to shame) as the new president of Egypt. Egypt’s newly appointed Vice President, Omar Suleiman, was the coordinator of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program. The nomination of Suleiman – and new Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq – confirms what many analysts and protesters have already known. There is a huge to question about the extent to which regime change will actually come about in Egypt. We have always said that this is Orchestrated change, and nothing will change.
CNN Egypt correspondent Ben Wederman agrees “New VP Omar Suleiman and PM Ahmed Shafiq are as Mubarak as Mubarak. Egyptians in no mood for more of the same.” (Jan25, Egypt). ElBredei got his Nobel Prize because he certified that Iraq had WMDs and Iran is on the way!!! These are the crooks that we are trying to force down the people of Egypt!!

The US has been supporting one of the most brutal regimes in the Middle East for 30 years under Mubarak and 15 years under Sadaat. CNN and the media is acting as if the State Department just woke up to this? Didn’t the world know that we were sitting on top of Mt. Vesuvius! Are we looking at another Algeria (where the legally elected government of the Salvation Front was prevented to take power)?

Don’t we know that the people want Ikhwan Ul Muslimeen –but that does not US and Israeli interests. What else will they do to prevent he real representative of the Egyptians (Muslim Brotherhood)? Everything was tried in Lebanon, but Hizbullah won anyway.

Three personalities have shaped the Middle East. Syed Qutub, and Hasan Al Banna the Pakistani Maududi. Syed Abul A’ala Maududi was born in September 25, 1903 and set up his Jamat e Islami (JI) in Pakistan. Banna was very impressed by the JI and pattered his IM on the JI. While Banna died early, Maududi lived along time and wrote many books which are widely read in Egypt. In fact most Egyptians know Maududi more than they know about any other Pakistani.

Syed Qutb, the doyen of the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, had a very profound impact on the Muslim Arab youth coming out of dark ages of Nasser’s socialism in the late 60s. Western writers in recent years have focused on him as one of the two most influential Muslim thinkers of this century, the other being Syed Maududi. Just like Lenin had revised pure Marxism, Syed Qutb in his jail cell wrote a book in which he revised Hassan al-Banna’s vision of establishing an Islamic state in Egypt after the nation was thoroughly Islamized. Syed Qutb used Maududi’s philosophy about a revolutionary vanguard which would first establish an Islamic state and then, bring about Islamization of Egypt. Qutb like Maududi was against Arab nationalistic ideologies. Qutub’s 11 years in prison walls gave him an opportunity to confirm what Maududi’s writings. In 1965 Qutub published his seminal works “Mallem Fittareek” (Milestones), which led to his re-arrest with the accusation of conspiracy against the Egyptian President, Abdul Nasser. It is amazing that it was almsot the same time when Maududi arrested by Ayub Khan under similar charges. Maududi convicted and sentenced to be hanged was pardoned by Ayub Khan. Syed Qutb however was hanged by Nasser for sedition. His followers looked toward Maududi for intellectual capital. Maududi died on September 22, 1979 but his works are read all over the Arab world.

Hasan al-Banna, the eldest son of watch repairman was born in Al-Mahmudiyya Egypt in October 1906. In 1927 he formed the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun). In the book “Letter To A Muslim Student” (FOSIS,1995) Banna explained the dynamics of the Ikhwan. His greatest achievement was his ability to create a sophisticated, organizational structure aiming to translate his vision into real life. The Ikhwan was not merely a social, political or religious association or group. It was a movement. By 1934, the Ikhwan had established more than fifty branches in Egypt. The focused on establishing a social network of schools, mosques and factories. At the end of World War II, the Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen had over half a million active workers and about 3 million active supporters. Over two thousand branches were in existence altogether and fifty in Sudan – which at the time was part of Egypt. While the royalty of Egypt was kowtowing to the colonialists, Al-Banna told the Ambassador that Egypt and all its money is the property of the Egyptian people and that Britain’s time in Egypt was coming to an end. Due to his Anti-British activities Al-Banna was exiled to Upper Egypt in 1948.

Nasser and Saddat were not the only ones who baned the Ikhwan—the government of Noqrashi Pasha banned the Ikhwan despite the fact the Ikhwan fought for Egypt in 1948. The Ikhwan was blamed for the murder of the puppet Prime Minister and banned. Shortly afterwards, on the 12th of February 1949, Hassan al-Banna, 43 at the time was assassinated. He was survived by a daughter named “Esteshhaad” – martyrdom. The Muslim Brotherhood has survived all attempts to stifle it and has grown stronger in Egypt. The Islamic resurgence manifest today in the Arab world today owes its origin directly or indirectly to the Muslim Brotherhood Organisation.

CNN props like Fawad Ajami really crack me up. When asked what the people of Egypt want, he said “we don’t know”. When pressed on the subject he balked, and said “It doesn’t matter what the people want, its the ground realities that matter. The Egyptian elite and the Egyptian Army will defend themselves against the opposing forces”. Well let us consider this Ajami statement. Mr Ajami could not get himself to tell the truth–the people of Egypt want the Ikhwan Ul Muslimeen, and the Ajami crowd is pressing the US to oppose the poplar will of the Egyptians. Well what else can we expect from one of the leading players rooting for the US invasion of Iraq. Mr. Ajami did talk about the riots in Iran, but could not utter a grunt against the occupation of Palestine.

Who is Mohamed ElBaradei? He is an opportunist and the fake “leader”. In fact, he is a nobody. His following in Egypt is non-existent, and no one really cares. He is being propped up as someone and getting a lot of unfair media coverage.

Will all this interference push Egypt to an Iranian type of chaos? American attempts to hijack the revolution and putting in another dictator– Strong Man Sulaiman (the newly appointed VP) or ElBaradei (the US point man who had declared that Iraq had WMD and got a Nobel Peace prize for doing it) may or may not succeed.
The world knows that ElBraadei and Sulaiman are being propped up to support the US ally in the Middle East so that the “occupation” does not end.

Prediction: The revolution has been hijacked by ElBerei (who has no following in Egypt) and Sulaimon the butcher of Cairo. They will try to control it, either like Algeria where the Salvation Front was prevented from taking power (by the US backed junta) and endured a decade of civil war–or like Pakistan where a dictator was uprooted by a popular movement but in the middle Mr. Zardari was imposed on the people.

Possibility: If we don’t stop this, and don’t learn from our mistake the Ikhwan Ul Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) will take over Egypt, one way or the other–abrogate the peace treaty with Israel and help the Palestinians get their state. in affect anohter Lebanon and an Arab version of Iran. An awakened Egypt will cause ripples affects all the way to Indonesia in the East and Morocco in the West.

How Tehran Sees Tunis
From Iran, it's more about 1979 than 2009.

As Tunisian President-for-Life Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled into ignominious exile two weeks ago, democrats around the world found hope in the notion that Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution would spread to Iran. The images of demonstrations from Sidi Bouzid to Tunis reminded Americans of the massive 2009 protests that gave rise to Iran's opposition Green Movement, and as pro-democracy movements inspired by Tunisia emerged in Egypt and Yemen, many observers saw a chance for Iran to be next. But looking closer, it's clear that Iranians -- from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on down to the Green Movement opposition -- view the Tunisia situation as vastly different from their own, and not one that's likely to spill over into a renewed push for democratic reform in their own country.

More... Despite the examples of Ben Ali and Egypt's beleaguered President Hosni Mubarak, Iran's leaders are far from running scared. In fact, Tehran is taking a distinctly more triumphalist understanding of the roots and effects of the Tunisian protests than American commentators would expect from another authoritarian Middle Eastern government -- particularly from one facing its own challenges from opposition forces.

In the week following Ben Ali's frantic flight to Saudi Arabia, reactions from Iranian officials and state-supported media were, as always, bold and self-assured. But this is no skin-deep grandstanding designed to force a positive spin on an unsettling example of political upheaval. Where Washington sees an anti-authoritarian uprising, Tehran describes a 1979-style rejection of a U.S.-supported secularist: Ahmadinejad referred to the Tunisian uprising as an expression of the people's will for an Islamic order, and the Iranian Majlis voted overwhelmingly to support the "revolution."

Shariatmadari explained, "When the Muslim nations of the region see clearly that not just one arrogant power but all arrogant powers with all their powers and capabilities have been bitterly defeated against the Islamic faith and national perseverance of the Muslim people of Iran, do you not think that they would rise up for the liberation of themselves and their homeland from under the dominance of dictators and foreign colonialism?" While this idea may sound preposterous to American ears, the resonance it holds in the upper echelons of the Iranian leadership only points to a more assertive Tehran.

In their triumphal postmortems of the Tunisian upheaval, Iran's conservatives have also excitedly forecasted similar revolutions in other pro-Western Arab regimes such as Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia -- a rare case where they and many American neoconservatives see eye to eye. These hard-liners are reveling in the notion that their Arab neighbors, particularly those governments that have aligned themselves closely with Washington, have become nervous about protesters emulating their Tunisian counterparts.

As for Ahmadinejad's critics, their point of view is not too different. The most important political fault line in Iran currently lies between hard-liners and more moderate conservatives within the Islamic Republic's establishment -- not between the government and the opposition. Optimistic Western observers might hope to see moderate conservatives take a different view from that of their archconservative rivals. But on the issue of Tunisia, the conservatives seem to be marching in lock step. While they have been more likely to read the events in Tunisia as a revolt against authoritarianism as such, even some of Ahmadinejad's main conservative critics see the uprising as evidence of the reach of the Islamic Revolution. A commentator in the often critical Mardom-Salari daily wrote that it was clear that Iran had shown Tunisia that "Islamism is superior to non-Islamic and secular governments in Islamic countries."

Perhaps the most important sign of Ahmadinejad's and Khamenei's staying power comes from the reaction of Iran''s dispirited and disorganized democratic opposition movement. Many in the Green Movement have embraced comparisons to the Tunisian protesters, but the opposition has largely struggled with how to interpret the Jasmine Revolution. Their reactions are bittersweet, ranging from a wistful sense of inspiration to soul-searching examinations of why Tunisians have succeeded where the Greens failed. Some have made excuses for the Green Movement's failure to remove Ahmadinejad, citing differences in the histories, demographics, and governments of Iran and Tunisia; others have tried hopefully to suggest that the Green Movement's lack of immediate and volatile results is actually a long-term strategic advantage.
One piece written by Jamileh Kadivar, the now-exiled reformist intellectual and parliamentarian, and posted on the opposition Rah-e Sabz website just hours after Ben Ali's departure from power may be the best indicator of the Green Movement's current mood. Marveling at the Tunisian people's amazing feat, she called their actions a model for all oppressed populations worldwide. Without explicitly referencing Iran, she wrote, "This is a dawn that can be very close at hand for many of the peoples who are under the oppression of tyranny, if they only have pride and trust in their own strength."

If American policymakers are looking for what the Green Movement is learning from the events in Tunisia, they may have to settle for Kadivar's vague optimism. What they will not find is an Iranian leadership conveying any sense of fear, disappointment, or insecurity as a result of the Tunisian uprising, or a reinvigorated, inspired reform movement like the one in Egypt. With no major divergence of views among the factions of the conservative establishment, it is impossible to conceive of cracks forming in the oft-uneasy alliance that maintains the Islamic Republic's stability; and the Green Movement is, at this point, simply too battered after a year and a half of severe repression to take advantage of cracks, if they were to open.
It would be easy -- especially in light of the spread of protests to Egypt and other countries -- for Washington to embrace the idea that now is the time to openly and actively support the Iranian opposition. But this would be a grave miscalculation based on a false impression of Iranian weakness, one destined to backfire and brand the Green Movement as American puppets. Barack Obama's administration would be wisest to concede that no domino is likely to fall eastward onto Tehran.

Lessons for Dictators' Club

Dictatorship for Dummies, Tunisia edition
The world cheered as it watched Tunisians, who had long suffered under the stultifying weight of dictatorship, rid themselves of their tormentor. When protestors amassed in the Tunisian capital, something incredible happened: The autocracy that President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had carefully cultivated for 23 years was no longer safe for its autocrat. Like any criminal, Ben Ali fled the scene of the crime, flying to Saudi Arabia for what he hopes will be a new life in exile. (It was better than the alternative.)

But there is a different audience also glued to its television sets, watching events in Tunisia unfold: the world's other dictators. When a despot falls, the rest of the club takes notice. On Christmas Day in 1989, the Romanian people quickly dispatched President Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife hours after the brutal communist regime crumbled. Zaire's strongman, President Mobutu Sese Seko, is said to have been horrified when he saw the image of his Romanian friend's corpse on CNN. And the Chinese leadership beefed up security, lest anyone in Beijing draw inspiration from Bucharest.

In 2005, after the democratic movements in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao huddled on the sidelines of a summit to discuss the danger of "color revolutions." And each year, without a hitch, Arab interior ministers - experts in the dark arts of "domestic security"- meet to compare notes. Ben Ali, a former interior minister himself, regularly played host for the conference. Indeed, the last meeting was in Tunis.

So, what has Tunisia taught the dictators' club?

Be repressive, but don't overdo it.
One of the student leaders who helped topple Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 recently told me, "The best dictators actually compromise all the time." It's true. When Russian pensioners blockade the roads in protest, the Kremlin accommodates. The Egyptian regime tolerates rallies against President Hosni Mubarak. Strikers in China get paid more often then they get prosecuted. In contrast, Ben Ali filled his prisons and had an informant on every corner. The costs outweighed the benefits, as he antagonized the population over issues he could have conceded. Smart dictators don't give up power that might curtail their ability to survive - but everything else is negotiable.

Don't try to be Singapore.
Yes, it would be nice if you could wake up as an Asian Tiger economy. But it's not likely. Ben Ali delivered 5 percent economic growth, great infrastructure, a college education for many and a 74-year life expectancy. Yet how did Tunisians repay him? If the regime's only legitimacy comes from its economic performance, then the moment prosperity slips, the entire system is vulnerable. Tunisia may have posted good numbers for the region, but Asian authoritarians never let their economies become dependent on European vacationers, as Tunisia did. It is far safer to have islands of bureaucratic dysfunction and keep expectations low. Because if you aim to be Singapore and come up short, the costs are high, especially if your only other talent is repression.

Give young people passports.
If you can't get everyone a job, encourage emigration. It is the best way to get rid of educated young people who will only cause you headaches when they realize they can't find work or must live with their parents. Hugo Chavez and Mubarak grasp this point: Venezuelans and Egyptians are leaving their native lands in droves. And the bonus? When your best and brightest make it in the United States, Europe or the Persian Gulf, they'll send hefty remittances to family back home.

Let the opposition exist - just don't let it win.
Ben Ali obliterated the political opposition. In hindsight, that was a mistake. A well-run political opposition is a dictator's best friend. You can create fake parties, you can harass legitimate parties, you can bribe them into fighting each other. The key is that they exist and that the system is sufficiently rigged so they can never stand in your way. Critics will say this is window dressing; they're wrong. Opposition parties, if properly managed, will siphon off some of the public's resentment. In Tunisia, people had no choice but to go to the streets.

Give them newspapers.
In Tunisia, there were two things you could count on: Every day the sun rose, and every day Ben Ali was front-page news. Media censorship is to be expected in such regimes, but there is no value in blanket coverage. Control television news and most radio, but let your critics and a few investigative reporters have some independent newspapers with small circulations. These will be outlets where people can blow off steam, and the regime will have a couple sources of information that it can trust, too.

Never negotiate with an angry mob.
When Ben Ali appeared on television and tried to save his skin by offering last-minute reforms and promising to step down at the end of his term, he inadvertently sealed his fate. Any Tunisian who had been on the fence now knew that the president was finished. In its waning hours, a regime faces a choice - retreat or lash out. Unfortunately, for those hardened regimes bent on survival, the lesson of Ben Ali's final hours is probably to bet on more tanks and less talk.

The people actually matter.
This is a terrifying concept for a dictatorship, but the ouster of Ben Ali cannot be pinned on anyone other than Tunisians themselves. No one is alleging that the United States, France or some other foreign power was behind it. In fact, autocratic Tunisia was a reliable Western ally, and the United States didn't criticize Ben Ali until he was packing his bags. Arab regimes can't blame Islamists; Ben Ali had long since rounded them up or chased them overseas. No political opposition mobilized the people, because it was practically nonexistent. The regime failed on bread-and-butter issues - unemployment, the economy, corruption - and this, paired with the indignities of the regime's repression, was enough to start a revolution.

Tunisia offers lessons for the rest of us, too. Chief among them should be this: We left Tunisians to rid themselves of their dictator. Now that they have, let's not ignore them again. Tunisians must do most of the work, but they shouldn't have to work alone.

America's Other Most Embarrassing Allies

Maintaining good relations with autocrats is an unfortunate but often necessary component of the delicate balancing act that is U.S. foreign policy. But as Washington learned once again this week, supporting an strongman for the sake of stability can present risks of its own. Here are eight more alliances that could prove embarrassing.
SAUDI ARABIA
Leader: King Abdullah

Record: The king has ruled Saudi Arabia since 2005. As ruler of a country with no elections, parliament, or political parties, Abdullah and his family exercise unchecked power within the kingdom, and -- thanks to their control of one-fifth of the world's oil reserves and Islam's two holiest sites -- quite a bit of influence beyond their borders as well. Abdullah surprised many by undertaking some minor reforms of the country's clerical establishment in 2009, though this may have had more to do with a desire to consolidate his power than any enlightened pluralistic impulses. The 86-year-old king has suffered poor health in recent years, leading to speculation about which of his relatives will succeed him.
The kingdom remains one of the most repressive countries on Earth, particularly so for its 9 million female citizens, who are prevented from holding many jobs or driving and are considered by law to be legally beholden to their husbands. Practicing any religion other than Islam is banned. Torture and detention without trial are commonplace. Around 2,000 people were arrested in 2009 alone on political charges.
U.S. support: Whether they're kissing and holding hands or bowing, American presidents of both parties can be counted on to show their affection for the House of Saud, a tradition dating back to Franklin Roosevelt's administration. As the only country in the world with "spare production capacity" -- enough extra oil that they can affect global energy prices at will -- Saudi cooperation is crucial in order to keep the U.S. economy humming.
Since 9/11, the Saudis have also provided aid and intelligence to the U.S.-led war on terrorism and cracked down on violent extremists in the kingdom and across the border in Yemen. Yet questions remain about the degree to which members of the Saudi royal family still provide financial assistance to Al Qaeda. The U.S. also relies on Saudi Arabia's stabilizing influence in the Middle East as a counterweight to Iran and as a mediator with the Palestinian Authority. In 2010, the relationship was further cemented by a $60 billion weapons deal including fighter jets, helicopters, and missiles.
YEMEN
Leader: Ali Abdullah Saleh

Record: Saleh first took power in Northern Yemen in a military coup in 1978 and has ruled the entire country since unification in 1991. Opposition parties are marginalized, parliamentary elections have been indefinitely postponed, and civilians are frequently caught up in military strikes in the country's lawless south.
Yemen is both one of the world's least stable countries, with an ongoing insurgency by Shiite rebels in the country's south, and one of the most repressive: Arbitrary detention and torture are pervasive and "honor killings" of women by family members frequently go unpunished. Inspired by the events in Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrators have taken to the streets of the capital Sana'a for near-daily protests since mid-January, demanding Saleh's removal as president.
U.S. support: Saleh might seem like an unlikely U.S. ally. In addition to his autocratic style and tolerance of official corruption, he was a close ally of Saddam Hussein and supported Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. But counterterrorism makes for strange bedfellows: Extremist groups within Yemen have been the source of numerous anti-American terrorist attacks, from the U.S.S. Cole bombing in 2000 to the 2009 Christmas Day bomb plot to the 2010 printer bomb attempt. It's also reputedly the home of noted terrorist Anwar Al-Awlaki and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Given the dangers emanating from Yemen, U.S. policymakers have decided that Saleh's efforts to restore order the country are the best bet for preventing further attacks, and military aid to the country has more than doubled since the Christmas plot. U.S. military aid to Yemen will likely reach $250 million in 2011, in addition to substantial increases in development aid.
JORDAN
Leader: King Abdullah II

Record: When the Western-educated Abdullah took the throne in 1993, hopes were high that political reforms would follow. The government lifted 20 years of martial law in 1989, restoring the country's parliament. But open democracy did not follow: The country's election system remains deeply flawed, gerrymandered to support tribal candidates and government loyalists. The country's largest opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front, has boycotted the last two parliamentary elections citing widespread fraud and vote-buying. The government has cited the electoral success of Hamas in the nearby Palestinian territories to justify the slow pace of political reforms in the country.
Abdullah's economic reforms have produced steady GDP growth, but like Egypt, this hasn't translated into improved quality of life for the country's poorest citizens. Unemployment may be as high as 30 percent in the kingdom, and the poverty rate is around 25 percent. Thousands protested the government's economic policies with a sit-in outside parliament on Jan. 16.
U.S. support: The U.S. relies on Jordan for counterterrorism assistance as well as its often constructive role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Under the Hashemite royal family, Jordan has pursued one of the most consistently pro-American foreign policies in the Middle East. It has been rewarded with more than $6 billion in development aid since 1952; it's the second-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid on a per-capita basis. In 2010, the U.S. and Jordan signed a development deal worth $360 million. The U.S. has also provided significant aid to the Jordan military, including a new fleet of F-16 fighters in 2007.
ETHIOPIA
Leader: Meles Zenawi

Record: The 2010 election, in which Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's party won a remarkable 99.6 percent of the vote, was the culmination of what Human Rights Watch called "the government's five-year strategy of systematically closing down space for political dissent and independent criticism." This included attacks and arrests of prominent opposition figures, the shutting down of newspapers and assaults on journalists critical of the government, and doling out international food aid as an incentive to get poor Ethiopians to join the ruling party.
In addition to attacks on domestic media and NGOs, the government also jammed broadcasts by Voice of America and Deutsche Welle in the run-up to the elections. The U.S. NGO Freedom House downgraded Ethiopia to "Not Free" for the first time in its annual Freedom in the World survey this year.
U.S. support: Bordered by Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia benefits from being an at least nominally pro-American government in a very dangerous neighborhood. In 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton described Zenawi as the leader of an "African Renaissance." Washington's strong support for Addis Ababa continued under President George W. Bush, who saw Zenawi's primarily Christian government as a bulwark against Islamic extremism in East Africa, and poured in millions in military aid. Bush opposed legislation linking military aid for Ethiopia to human rights and gave tacit support for the country's 2007 invasion of Somalia.
The rhetoric is somewhat less enthusiastic under the Obama administration -- the State Department strongly criticized the 2010 election, for instance -- but the U.S. will continue to fund Ethiopia to the tune of $583.5 million this year, despite evidence that the government is directly using this aid to suppress dissent.
UGANDA
Leader: Yoweri Museveni

Record: Museveni talks a big game on democracy, economic development, and anti-corruption efforts, and to be fair he did institute a number of promising reforms early in his presidency, encouraging the development of free press and elections following decades of strongman rule. But the president has lately started to resemble his predecessors, abolishing term limits after nearly three decades in office, launching legal attacks on independent journalists, harassing opposition parties and flying a $50 million private jet while more than a third of his people live on less than $1 a day, having previously criticized other African leaders for indulging in similar perks. NGOs have also documented numerous cases of unlawful detention and torture by the country's Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force.
Uganda came under international condemnation in 2010 for a proposed law, still pending, that would punish homosexuality with harsh sentences including the death penalty. Museveni initially supported the law, but later backed off after several countries in Europe threatened to withhold foreign aid. The country's most prominent gay rights activist, David Kato, was beaten to death on Jan. 27, just weeks after a popular tabloid published his photo along with the caption, "Hang Them."
U.S. support: Uganda's stable government, economic growth, and effective response to HIV/AIDS have made it something of a poster child for African development, and it's one of the top recipients of U.S. aid in Africa. Additionally, Museveni has helped out his friends in Washington by contributing nearly 3,000 peacekeepers to the international mission in Somalia and carried out a massive military offensive against the Lord's Resistance Army, one of Africa's most notorious rebel groups.
Obama at first appeared reluctant to cozy up to Museveni, denying several attempts by the Ugandan leader to secure a White House meeting and publicly criticizing the anti-gay bill. But the U.S. administration was nearly silent after Museveni used the 2010 World Cup bombing committed by Somalia's al Shabaab militants in Kampala as a pretext to further restrict media coverage and opposition parties, likely balancing democracy concerns with the need for Uganda's continued support in Somalia. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson even told reporters that Uganda had conducted "free and fair elections, in 2006, contradicting the State Department's own reports, which cited numerous irregularities.
UZBEKISTAN
Leader: Islam Karimov

Record: Karimov, Uzbekistan's first and only post-independence president, has routinely stifled political dissent in Uzbekistan, banning opposition groups -- particularly Islamic ones -- stifling the press and jailing thousands. His country is routinely cited as one of the world's worst torturers, with punishments including beatings, rape, and even boiling meted out in its overcrowded jails. Uzbekistan faced international condemnation in 2005 after hundreds of unarmed protesters demonstrating in support of a group of arrested local businessmen were shot by security forces in the city of Andijan. Karimov has repeatedly extended his own tenure beyond the constitutionally mandated two-term limit and international observers have dismissed the country's elections as shams.
U.S. support: Uzbekistan shut down a U.S. airbase in the country in 2005, after U.S. criticism of the events at Andijan. The base remains closed, but relations are improving. Gen. David Petraeus made a high-profile visit to the country in 2009 to discuss a possible Uzbek role in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. In April of that year, the two countries signed a deal to allow supplies for the NATO effort to travel through Uzbekistan. In November 2010, CENTCOM commander Gen. James Mattis visited Uzbekistan to sign a security cooperation pact, including military training.
The administration has continued to push Uzbekistan to improve its human rights record, but the country's real estate -- and proximity to the war in Afghanistan -- is evidently too valuable for it to be cut off altogether.
KAZAKHSTAN
Leader: Nursultan Nazarbayev

Record: Nazarbayev, former leader of the Kazakh Communist Party, has ruled the country without any serious political challenge since independence in 1991. Restrictive election laws make it nearly impossible to opposition parties to run, anti-government newspapers are routinely harassed and shut down, and corruption -- particularly related to the country's energy sector -- is reportedly pervasive throughout the state.
In January, the compliant Kazakh Parliament asked Nazarbayev to call a referendum that would extend his term to 2020, skipping the planned 2012 and 2017 elections entirely. Police cracked down hard on opposition protests against the move. After international condemnation of the plan, Nazarbayev scrapped it and instead called for snap presidential elections to be held nearly two years ahead of schedule.
U.S. support: Kazakhstan and the United States have cooperated closely since 1996 on a project to secure and dispose of the country's Soviet-era nuclear material. Kazakhstan has also provided transit routes for the U.S.-led war effort in Afghanistan. The country's estimated 85 trillion cubic feet of natural gas also make it a highly attractive regional partner.
To be fair, Kazakhstan isn't nearly as repressive as its central Asian neighbors, has been far more effective at delivering economic growth, and is -- along with Ukraine -- one of the great nonproliferation success stories since the end of the Cold War. But U.S. praise for the regime, which has never held a genuinely contested election, has been ridiculously effusive at times. In a 2006 meeting between Bush and Nazarbayev, the U.S. president described Kazakhstan as a "free nation" with a "commitment to institutions that will enable liberty to flourish."
VIETNAM
Leader: Nguyen Tan Dung

Record: The Communist Party of Vietnam is the only party allowed by law and appoints the country's leaders from within its own ranks -- Nguyen Tan Dung was reappointed for a second term in Jan. 26. According to Human Rights Watch, Vietnam has intensified its repression of human rights over the past year, imprisoning human rights defenders, bloggers, and anti-corruption campaigners. Religious groups, both Christian and Buddhist, have faced repeated harassment. Police brutality and deaths under police custody are commonplace.
Like China, Vietnam filters the Internet within the country, blocking objectionable websites and requiring service providers and Internet cafes to install monitoring software to track users.
U.S. support: Thirty-five years after the end of the Vietnam War and 15 after diplomatic relations were restored, the U.S.-Vietnam relationship has never been closer. The two countries signed a free-trade agreement in 2006, moving Vietnam one step closer to WTO membership. With an eye toward a rising China, the two countries have also deepened defense cooperation, including military drills and a potential civilian nuclear deal. In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that despite "profound differences" over human rights, it was time for the countries to take their relationship to the "next level."
Those two impulses may prove more difficult to reconcile than Clinton had hoped: In January 2011, the United States registered a protest with the Vietnamese government after a U.S. diplomat was wrestled to the ground and then arrested by police while trying to visit the home of a prominent Vietnamese dissident.

How Tehran Sees Tunis

As Tunisian President-for-Life Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled into ignominious exile two weeks ago, democrats around the world found hope in the notion that Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution would spread to Iran. The images of demonstrations from Sidi Bouzid to Tunis reminded Americans of the massive 2009 protests that gave rise to Iran's opposition Green Movement, and as pro-democracy movements inspired by Tunisia emerged in Egypt and Yemen, many observers saw a chance for Iran to be next. But looking closer, it's clear that Iranians -- from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on down to the Green Movement opposition -- view the Tunisia situation as vastly different from their own, and not one that's likely to spill over into a renewed push for democratic reform in their own country.

Despite the examples of Ben Ali and Egypt's beleaguered President Hosni Mubarak, Iran's leaders are far from running scared. In fact, Tehran is taking a distinctly more triumphalist understanding of the roots and effects of the Tunisian protests than American commentators would expect from another authoritarian Middle Eastern government -- particularly from one facing its own challenges from opposition forces.

In the week following Ben Ali's frantic flight to Saudi Arabia, reactions from Iranian officials and state-supported media were, as always, bold and self-assured. But this is no skin-deep grandstanding designed to force a positive spin on an unsettling example of political upheaval. Where Washington sees an anti-authoritarian uprising, Tehran describes a 1979-style rejection of a U.S.-supported secularist: Ahmadinejad referred to the Tunisian uprising as an expression of the people's will for an Islamic order, and the Iranian Majlis voted overwhelmingly to support the "revolution."

Tunisia's president flees the country

After four weeks of steadily escalating riots across Tunisia, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali lost his grip on power Friday January 14th. The country's prime minister announced that he was taking over to organize early elections and usher in a new government.

U.S. officials confirmed that Ben Ali, 74, had fled the North African country, but his whereabouts were not publicly known. Wherever he was hiding, the day's events suggested that his 23 years as Tunisia's ruler were over, submerged by a wave of unrest set off by economic deprivation, official corruption and political frustration in the mostly Sunni Muslim country.
The spectacle of the iron-fisted leader being swept from office was certain to resonate elsewhere in the Arab world. Smaller protests have erupted in Egypt, Jordan and Algeria in recent weeks as the region's many autocratic governments, often in power without the underpinning of democratic elections, have come under increasing pressure from similarly frustrated youths.

Half a century, two leaders
Tunisia has been ruled by two men since its independence, and though they both helped to advance progressive policies, political freedom has been restricted. The country had relative stablility under President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, but recent government clashes with protesters drove him out of power.

Despite the pledge of a new political opening, Ben Ali's fall from power opened a possibly dangerous horizon for Tunisia, a sunny nation of 10.5 million people known mainly as a cheerful tourist destination for European vacationers and a haven of tolerance in a region often unsettled by Islamist extremism.
With no obvious successor to Ben Ali in the wings, it was unclear whether Ghannoushi, as a heretofore faithful follower of the president, could muster authority to control the mobs who have been setting the agenda in Tunis over the past several weeks. Streets were reported quiet Friday evening under heavy security.

Leila Trabelsi, Ben Ali's wife, and her family were reputed to have used the influence associated with the presidency to build private fortunes in real estate and other business deals. As protest violence - fueled by social media such as Facebook and Twitter - spread across the country beginning last month, rioters frequently directed their wrath at property associated with the Trabelsi family.

The simmering discontent erupted into the open Dec. 17 in the inland city of Sidi Bouzid after an unlicensed fruit vendor identified as Mohammed Bouazzi set himself afire. Bouazzi acted after a policeman confiscated the wares off his cart and, according to news reports, after he was slapped by a female city hall employee to whom he had turned to complain.

From there violence quickly spread to other cities. Police used tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition to put down the protests, with a steadily rising casualty count increasing the anger among unemployed youths and long-suppressed political opponents.
By Tuesday, the rioting had spread to Tunis, and protesters were demanding that Ben Ali step down. In actions that would have been unheard of only a few weeks ago, the president's photo was ripped from walls and police stations were ransacked.
In what was seen as a last gesture to save his rule, Ben Ali earlier Friday had declared a state of emergency, fired his entire government and promised to hold early legislative elections within six months. That promise followed by only hours a pledge to leave office by 2014 and to order police to stop firing on protesters, release those arrested in the riots and lift the country's suffocating censorship

11 Pakistanis becoming part of cellular community every minute

Every minute roughly 11 Pakistanis become a part of the cellular community and more than 430,000 SMS messages and 160,000 voice minutes are being exchanged in less than one minute.

The telecommunications sector contributes 3% to the country’s GDP whereas the total telecom sector revenue reached at Rs. 357.7 billion in the year 2009-10 compared to Rs. 333 billion in the previous year.

This is despite the fact that the cellular industry in the country is paying the highest taxes in comparison to the entire region.

According to official sources,incomes of 6 out of every 1,000 persons in the country are tied with the telecom sector.

This is not only a moment of joy but also a reaffirmation to the common Pakistani man and woman that access to technology is not a privilege limited to the elite, but a right that is available to them that is accessible and affordable.

Half of Pakistanis including women have access to a cell phone together with rural areas (two-thirds in urban areas) while more than 86 percent of men have their own cell phone, 40 percent of women do.

These figures suggest a much higher access to cell phone (available in the household or within the extended family) than the figures for regular usage.

Talking to APP an official in Pakistan Telecommunication Authority said basic data services such as SMS, are used by 40.2pc cell phone users with higher usage in urban areas (45 percent) than in rural (36-7 percent). SMS usage is also more frequent among men.

He said internet usage remains low and is concentrated in urban areas. Internet and e-mail are more accessed used at home.