Bringing Home the Desert -by Suleman Akhtar

Arabization of Pakistan: Bringing the desert home

There was a land of Cavaliers and Cotton Fields called the Old South. Here in this pretty world, Gallantry took its last bow. Here was the last ever to be seen of Knights and their Ladies Fair, of Master and of Slave. Look for it only in books, for it is no more than a dream remembered, a Civilization gone with the wind. -An introductory foreword to the film ‘Gone with the wind’ (1939)

Civilizations can never be made up, this is all hitherto history has to tell us, but yes they can be ruined to irretrievable notwithstanding. Societies are never absolute in their very essence. This is the natural organic flow of events that weaves the edifice of a society over the time period by encompassing the divergent customs, languages, dogmas and traits. The final synthesis, what we call a society, is the one to impart the distinguishing identity to its adherents. Firmer the foundations of society more preeminent will be the identity yielding out of it. Societies are prone to decadence only when they cease to embrace the extrinsic flavors or when become the subject of deliberate acculturation. Later is the case with ‘the land of pure’ which, as for some, is yet to be more pure.

Pure is the word and Arabization is the synonym. Pure of what? Pure of specter of the pre-partition Indian identity that was congenital inheritance of Indian Muslims bestowed on by the indigenous society that had evolved over hundreds of years by the commingling of various cultures and civilizations. Plagued by quandary, the Pakistani state, after the partition, was quick to embrace the Pan-Islamic identity embellished with salient features of Arabian Peninsula whilst cunningly blending it with religion in order to render it more acceptable for the local populace. The identity engineers considered it the last resort to homogenize the diverse local cultures and vernacular languages by binding them in a construct emanated from religion based identity. That was ‘Fall of Dhaka’ that led to expedition of the Arabization process. Eminent historian Dr. Mubarak Ali explains the predicament in the words:

“Since its inception Pakistan has faced the monumental task of formulating its national identity separate from India. Partitioned from the ancient civilization of India, Pakistan has struggled to construct its own culture; a culture not just different and unique from India, but one appreciable by the rest of the world. ..The tragedy of 1971 [when Bangladesh separated] brought a shock to the people and also a heavy blow to the ideology of Pakistan… More or less convinced of their Islamic heritage and identity, Pakistan’s government and intelligentsia consciously attempted to Islamize the country.”

History itself has been the cardinal victim since antiquity in the hands of plunderers who deem it their foremost target for their ulterior motives. That’s what happened here. History, taught in public schools, starts from the arrival of Muslim Arabs and ends at carving a Muslim state out of Hindu India. Everything else has been rendered smokescreen. The past, prior to Muhammad Bin Qasim, is direct threat to the engineered Arab identity as it was obviously Hindu-Buddhist –so omitted out of purpose. The puritans, Aurangzeb Alamgir and Ahmad Sirhindi, get all the praise since they are more in line with the unyielding version of Arab Islam whilst heretic Akbar is accused of inaugurating a new religion purposefully disdaining the fact that people were far better off in Akbar’s era. There’s not even a single mentioning of inter-faith harmony Dara Shikow had been preaching given that there’s no space whatsoever for trans-religious approach in a society aimed for adherents of single creed. Plunderer Mehmud Ghaznavi has been denominated as ‘Idol-Breaker’ merely to glorify the unified Islamic triumphalism over the misbeliever India. This systematic maligning of young minds is not confined to only government educational institutes but by an act of parliament, passed in 1976, all private schools are also required to follow this curriculum. Rubina Saigol, an expert on education says: “Our state system is the biggest madrasa. We keep blaming madrasas for everything and, of course, they are doing a lot of things I would disagree with. But the state ideologies of hate and a violent, negative nationalism are getting out there where madrasas cannot hope to reach.”

Over the last three decades Pakistan has seen some drastic changes in societal demeanor and etiquettes ranging from language to customs. Dissemination of construct based on the Arab identity is bearing fruit. ‘Abaya’ that was an unknown word in Urdu language has now become the benchmark of the fictitious morality that is the ultimate result of deliberate assimilation of arid Arab culture. Even the moderate ones are obliged to wear Abaya to meet the newly contrived moral standards of society. ‘Chaadar aur Char Dewaari’ (veiled behind high brick walls) policy of dictator Zia-ul-Haq is turning out to be the worst kind of oppression of women, along with the laws like Hudood ordinance enacted during his regime.

Even the language has not been spared amidst this whole drivel of purification. Article 31/2 (a) of constitution of Pakistan states: “The State shall endeavor, as respects the Muslims of Pakistan to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language..”. What’s that, a pathetic attempt to make Arabic lingua franca for Pakistan where less than 1% population can understand Arabic? What about the divergent local languages or even the so-called national language? Most common but glaring example that may be put forward to underline the predicament is gradual replacement of the Indo-Persian ‘Khuda-Hafiz’ with Arabic ‘Allah-Hafiz’ implying that Arabic Allah is the only proper word for God.  Khuda is an Indo-Persian term to say “God”. It is built on the same building blocks that other Indo-European languages use. English say God, Germans say Gott or Gutt, Persians say Khuda. The G is a variation of Kh and the utt or od is a variation of “uda”. They’re very similar. On the other hand, Arabic is Afro-Asiatic language. By taking a look to other Semitic languages such as Hebrew, they are very near to Arabic flavor. As for instance Jews say Elohim that sounds very familiar while reciting the word ‘Allah’. Where do the attributes of God come into the matter from? Some of the 99 names of God have their origins in classical Hebrew instead of Arabic. So in the view of this logic should those be abandoned too? Renowned scholar Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy sheds the light on issue:

“Persian, the language of Mughal India, had once been taught as a second or third language in many Pakistani schools. But, because of its association with Shiite Iran, it too was dropped and replaced with Arabic. The morphing of the traditional “Khuda hafiz” (Persian for “God be with you”) into “Allah hafiz” (Arabic for “God be with you”) took two decades to complete. The Arab import sounded odd and contrived, but ultimately the Arabic God won and the Persian God lost.”

The most considerate aspect of this whole panorama is the puritanical version of Islam i.e. Salafism / Wahabism that is predominately a phenomenon traces its roots to Arabian Peninsula and has been instrumented by the identity surgeons to homogenize the cultures that have not even an infinitesimal thing in common –consequences are horrible. This unyielding interpretation of Islam puts great emphasis on rituals and codes of conducts than on substance quite contrary to the Indian version of Islam that is marked with local customs evolved over the centuries through intermingling of diverse doctrines. All religions have two aspects that are theological beliefs related to one’s relationship with divine reality and sociological beliefs comprising of social behaviors dealing with human society. Former remain more or less absolute in their very nature while the later do change with the passage of time when religions go trans-regional. Problem, predominately, starts erupting when the sociological beliefs are subjugated by state to implement and propagate hidden agendas. These sociological beliefs then lay the bases of hatred, bigotry and misogyny. This is what has been done in land of the pure in the name of purifying religion by escalating a particular expression of religion to the stature of only-viable-interpretation-of-Islam. God has been portrayed as some Arabic speaking deity who is restricted to ethno-linguistic boundary which is clearly in contradiction of message of religion.

As the Qur’an says: “Another of His signs is the creation of the heavens and earth, and the diversity of your languages and color. There truly are signs in this for those who know” (30:22). There is also this famous verse: “O people, we created you from the same male and female, and rendered you distinct peoples and tribes, so that you may know one another.” (49:13)

As for elaborating further the above discussed phenomenon take the example of Madrassas in Pakistan. They are the social sites for the reproduction of Islamic orthodoxy. Hence, to say that the ideological orientation of madrassa education is conservative is to state the obvious. The madrassas in Muslim South Asia teach a curriculum known as Dars-i-Nizami, first introduced by Mullah Nizamuddin Sihalvi (d.1747) who was a scholar of some repute in Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy in Lucknow. But this was only during the last two decades of twentieth century when they became involve in militancy despite having the two hundred years apathetic history. The curriculum of Madrassas has been same for about 150 years which is most pacifist in nature. Its approach to Islam is ultra-conservative, literalist, legalist and sectarian, but definitely not revolutionary or militant. If this were the case the militant tendencies of Madrassas could have been observed during the most volatile events like partition, fall of Dhaka and Indo-Pak wars. What happened during the last two decades of twentieth century, a classic example of importing doctrine, is not-so-secret now and answers lie with the diplomats and Generals who were powerbrokers in Islamabad, Kabul, Riyadh and Langley, VA at that time.

Kamal Azfar, a Pakistani writer, states the dilemma in words:

“There are two concepts of Pakistan: the first empirical and the second utopian. The empirical concept is based on solid foundations of history and geography while the utopian concept is based on shifting sands. Utopia is not an oasis but a mirage… Samarqand and Bukhara and the splendors of the Arab world are closely related to us but we do not possess them. Our possessions are Moenjodaro and Sehwan Sharif, Taxila and Lahore, Multan and the Khyber. We should own up to all that is present here in the Indus Valley and cease to long for realities not our own for that is false-consciousness.”

To conclude, I will take liberty to speak for me and the third generation, I belong to too, who has the privilege to breathe in the airs of this still-not-so-pure-land and is much Pakistani now. I’m not going to mourn the Indus Valley civilization, but what is the substitute they offer me if it’s not desert? I refrain from whining about the bitter reality that I don’t have the clue of half of indigenous literature that has been written in Persian, but to say what do they have in the pipeline for me? I have nothing against whatsoever version of religion, but how would they justify the attacks on the shrines of my land? I’m all for endorsing their policies, but what is the vindication they have of myriads of dead bodies of my country-fellows? I’m ready to relinquish Khusrow, Ghalib, Bhittai, Bhulla, Rahman Baba and Gul Khan, but can they introduce me to the single one of this stature? I shall not question them, but will they care to tell me, ‘who am I’?

Eid films: revival or survival of cinema?

Karachis’ cinema houses are back in business. But for how long, that’s the question.

This Eid not just a big-budgeted, A-list Indian film but the release of two Pakistani Urdu films were also eagerly awaited: Syed Faisal Bukhari’s Bhai Loag and film star Reema’s second directorial venture Love Mein Ghum.
While it has to be said that cinema-goers did make an effort to watch the Pakistani movies, it was Reema’s film that drew lesser praise and audience. On the other hand, Bollywood’s Bodyguard, starring Salman Khan and Kareena Kapoor, made movie buffs queue up at ticket counters for hours at the new, well-equipped multiplexes as well as at old facilities such as Bambino cinema.
According to a rough estimate, Bodyguard, directed by Siddique, raked up Rs5 million from 21 cinemas of the country only on the first day (Aug 31) of its screening. (Don’t ask about what it has managed to accumulate worldwide.)
At Karachi’s Cineplex and Atrium Mall those who couldn’t get tickets for the Salman Khan movie were seen going for Bhai Loag and Love Mein Ghum as second and third options. Bodyguard, despite having a bit of a puerile storyline, was loved by the audiences for its slick action sequences and nice romantic moments between the two protagonists.
Unexpectedly, some say expectedly, Faisal Bukhari’s Bhai Loag, a different take on the local underworld scene, overshadowed Reema’s Love Mein Ghum business-wise. This also came as a surprise because the latter has its song sung by Indian play-back singers and has one Indian cast member, comedian Johnny Lever, working alongside Moammar Rana, Reema, Ali Saleem and Javed Sheikh. The general view of the public was that between the two Pakistani films, Faisal Bukhari’s was more worthy of being watched. Not that Love Mein Ghum could be dubbed a failure. The film too is doing reasonably well at the box office, not as much as its two competitors though.
“I’ve come to see Bhai Loag. I’ve heard it’s a good film,” said Jamil Ahmed, a middle-aged man, roaming around the ticket counter at Bambino cinema at least 90 minutes before the 3 o’clock show.
Bhai Loag’s popularity among the masses could also be gauged from the reaction of the rather taciturn gatekeeper at Bambino: “Bhai Loag acha chal raha hai” (Bhai Loagis doing well). Raja Shakil, who works on the same premises, claims that since Eid Faisal Bukhari’s movie has had at least four house-full shows, whereas Reema’s had a 90 per cent seats occupied at best.
“I think it’s good that Pakistani films are being released. I’m busy these days with my own theatre play Amn Ka Chhakka. Despite that I made it a point that I come and see a local film,” said Akhtar Shirani, a known Karachi stage artiste, talking to Dawn near the box office counter at Scala cinema.
Keeping with modern times, Nishat cinema is running the two Pakistani films at a time and reports are that it’s the saga of the underworld that has managed to pull in more people.
Sources told Dawn that some influential individuals tried their best to stop Bodyguardfrom being screened on the special day.
Only at the 11th hour it was allowed to be shown in Pakistan.
Apart from Indian and Pakistani movies, a couple of Hollywood films also premiered on Eid — Captain America: The First Avenger and Conan the Barbarian — and both are doing well, according to an official at Atrium Mall.

Of messiahs and all

The major league

It was quite a sight watching many otherwise reasonable looking and sounding gentlemen who had been at the forefront of condemning at the drop of hat suddenly turn around and applaud the animated former minister after his explosive press conference on August 28.

Such somersaults are certainly not a rarity in this godforsaken republic. An edgy nation well known for always dreaming of a figurative messiah and a saviour riding in (in slow-motion) from a hazy horizon on a white horse/camel with a sword in one hand, a hangman’s noose in the other and the holy book spread out across his heart; or in the case of Zulfiqar Mirza, on his head!

Not that these dreams about benevolent strong men emerging to deliver justice and honour to the teeming millions have remained to be mere fantasies. Far from it.

From Ayub Khan to Z A. Bhutto to even the dreadful Ziaul Haq, all emerged as saviours.

After imposing the country’s first Martial Law, Ayub Khan was hailed by the majority of Pakistanis for rescuing the country from corrupt bureaucrats, squabbling politicians and ‘dangerous’ Bengali, Baloch, Sindhi and Pushtun nationalists.

The initial hailing of a relieved public only fattened Ayub’s messiah complex, so much so that by the late 1960s the messiah had truly lost touch with reality.

For example, in 1968 even when thousands of students and workers had begun a concentrated protest movement against the cronyism and corruption that had become the mainstay of the man’s government, Ayub decided to spend millions of Rupees to celebrate his regime’s ‘Decade of progress.’

Ayub’s fall mainly at the hands of those who’d hailed him as a saviour set a cyclic precedent that has continued to this day. Take the example of Z A. Bhutto for instance.

A truly popular leader, Bhutto was carried into power on the shoulders of millions of West Pakistanis, expecting him to perform a series of economic, political and social miracles.

Some six years later (in 1977) the same messiah was walking towards the gallows.

Did the country erupt with shame and anger at this atrocity engineered by a wily usurper, General Ziaul Haq? Nope. Why should it? After all here was a new messiah who, unlike Ayub and Bhutto, was waving the holy book in our faces calling it the country’s new constitution.

Those who were convinced that the secular despotism of Ayub and the left-liberal populism of Bhutto had failed to meet the hopes of Pakistan’s Muslim majority, were mighty impressed by Zia’s tough Islamist talk.

They were convinced that it was on his back they could piggyback their way towards making Pakistan an Islamic state.

Of course, apart from imposing certain ‘Islamic laws’ based on some puritanical strains and interpretations of the faith – in the process not only alienating the country’s minority religions, but many other Islamic sects as well – and actually institutionalizing corruption to keep his backers in the agencies, military, business community and feudal circles well fed, Zia soon fell from grace.

His unpopular dictatorship was only held afloat by the wayward ways of a divided opposition, relentless state repression and, of course, millions of Dollars and Riyals that kept pouring in from the coffers of the United States and Saudi Arabia to keep him at the forefront of a convoluted ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan against the already struggling Soviet forces.

In the end it was left to the state to finance and organize a momentous funeral for the once-upon-a-time messianic hope when he fell from the skies after an explosion in his plane saw it burst into flames over Bahawalpur in 1988.

Today the only thing one remembers of him are the seeds he sowed of whose poisonous trees and fruits we are still reaping and, of course, the many jokes that were cracked in his lifetime about his supposed piety.

But this did not stop another military man from getting entrapped by the messiah complex. And how could he not, especially in a country always on the lookout for miraculous saviours.

General Parvaz Musharraf’s popularity ratings in the first three years of his dictatorship (1999-2003) remained well over 60 percent. Surprisingly, this time around very few Pakistanis actually knew as to why they were hailing this messiah.

Here was a man who didn’t know his right eye (liberalism) from his left (propping-up Islamists). Believing he could carry on this cock-eyed charade, he ended up digging his own hole when the military’s own creations (the jihadis and the radicalization of society), sent him spinning to earth, committing one blunder after another.

In the end after facing an all-time low in his popularity ratings, this self-claimed eternal commando was forced to resign and go into exile, abused and cursed even by those who had so proudly voted for him in a so-called referendum in 2002.

As this country continues to look for, prop-up and then discard messiahs, very few it seems realize that messiahs fail because they are only our own exaggerated and mythical projections of justice, good governance and respect.

The mini-messiahs

Interestingly, whereas the major political parties seem to have sensed this and have started to avoid over-promising and getting trapped in the self-destructive messiah complex, Pakistanis have turned to certain minnows in this respect.

These are the mini-messiahs who arrive thinking they can become another Z A. Bhutto but usually end up in a limbo or worse, suffering from a rather sour case of delusion.

But it’s entirely not their fault. After all there is always going to be many young Pakistanis propping up a potential messiah, just like uploading an exiting new song on their Ipods only to be discarded and replaced by a newer tune.

Let’s profile a few well known cases of these mini-messiahs …

Asghar Khan

A former Air Martial who turned against the Ayub dictatorship, Ashgar Khan became an important clog in the progressive/democratic movement against the Ayub dictatorship.

For a while in the late 1960s, Asghar Khan’s popularity was at par with that of Z A. Bhutto’s.

Asghar reached a popularity peak in 1969. But Bhutto, with the backing of an emergent mass party, a well articulated ideology and a clearly-defined manifesto, eclipsed Khan in the 1970 election.

Asghar Khan’s line in the election on the other hand was simply ‘clean politics,’ but this didn’t mean much to an excitable electorate.

Just when it seemed Khan’s bubble had burst, he was propped-up once again, this time by the right-wing opposition alliance (the PNA) that went into the 1977 polls against Bhutto’s PPP.

He then led a mass movement against Bhutto that triggered Bhutto’s departure but at the same time put the country under its third martial law.

Though a democrat and secular, Asghar had joined a struggle led by right-wing religious parties against Bhutto and then he is also accused of being the man who actually invited the military to take over in July 1977.

Though Khan (through his own party, the Pakistan Thereek-i-Istaqlal) remained in politics till about the early 1990s, he was never again given the luxury of enjoying the saviour status.

Qazi Hussain Ahmed

A life-long member of the fundamentalist Jamat-i-Islami (JI), Qazi remained to be just another politician during most of his career in JI.

The JI was a staunchly centralised and elitist Islamist party whose leadership and support mainly came from the conservative urban middle-class segments.

In 1987, at age 50, Qazi was elected to head JI.

As the country’s working and peasant classes stuck with populist parties like the PPP, the growing urban bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie (that had began springing up during the Zia dictatorship), gallivanted towards moderate right-wing parties like Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N).

Qazi soon began manoeuvring JI towards more mass-level politics so it could at least appeal to the rising political ambitions of the new bourgeoisie.

Thus, before the 1993 elections, Qazi put the JI forward as a third, more ‘cleaner and incorruptible’ alternative to the PPP and PML-N.

Through an expensive election campaign, Qazi advertised himself as a saviour so much so that many commentators were sure that JI would be able to win a large number of seats.

But, alas, out of about the 300 seats that it contested in the 1993 elections, Qazi’s JI only managed to win three seats!

Qazi retired from politics in 2008.

Murtaza Bhutto

Riddled and wounded by a series of ethnic clashes and operation clean-ups between after 1986, Karachi and Sindh seemed to have had enough of parties like PPP and MQM.

As MQM went under the gun of the military and the Rangers in the early and mid-1990s, the PPP’s two governments under Benazir Bhutto began wobbling from corruption charges as well as concentrated efforts by Zia’s remnants in the intelligence agencies to topple her.

Just before the 1993 elections, many newspapers in Karachi and Sindh began running heightened reports about the return of Benazir’s brother, Murtaza Bhutto who’d been in exile ever since 1979.

Benazir at once began hinting that certain agencies were trying to block her return to power by propping up Murtaza.

She might have been right because though Murtaza had been named by the Zia regime in various cases of terrorism (through his clandestine organization the Al-Zulfiqar), his return to Pakistan (after thirteen years) was rather smooth.

Nevertheless, judicial complications delayed his return but he promptly formed his own PPP faction (from Syria) and (according to newspapers of the time) was ‘gaining popularity in Sindh and Punjab due to his anti-Zardari and anti-corruption stance.’

Well, Murtaza’s faction only managed to win a single seat in the 1993 elections and Murtaza’s messianic bubble had burst even before he finally returned to the country in 1994.

Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry

An imposing but apparently reserved Chief Justice who got into a tussle with General Parvez Musharraf. In 2007, Musharraf asked him to resign only to set alight a movement led by the lawyers to reinstate the CJ.

The movement was then entered by both big and small opposition political parties. But it wasn’t until it was popularly adopted by the private electronic media that the deposed CJ began being moulded into a messianic figure who would not only cleanse the judiciary, but also herald in a political and economic revolution!

The movement was initially centered around liberal and democratic lawyers and ideals, but it soon took a rightwards turn when the largely right-wing electronic media entered the fray, mainly reflecting the growing reactionary tendencies emerging within the urban middle-classes.

The CJ was reinstated after Musharraf’s departure in 2008 but the messianic sheen of the movement is now peeling off giving way to a more pragmatic approach.

Imran Khan

The ultimate messianic figure, this former Pakistan cricket captain and philanthropist entered politics in 1996 with a brand new party, the Pakistan Threreek-i-Insaf (PTI).

Many observers have compared Imran with Asghar Khan: A clean politician but without the tact of organizing a winnable political party.

Imran entered the fray as a messianic figure right from the start but his party only managed to win a single seat in the 1997 and 2002 elections.

But just when it seemed his career was as good as over, he was embraced by the electronic media, an event that gave him the platform to re-emerge as a popular figure among the country’s new generation of young urban middle-class Pakistanis.

Mixing renegade right-wing ideals with bygone leftist sloganeering, Khan is now being hailed as the saviour that Pakistan needs.

However, parties like the PML-N and MQM have alleged that Khan is being propped-up by the ISI and by the agency’s supposed mouthpieces in the electronic media so he could electorally challenge the mainstream parties that the military and the ISI feel can threaten their ‘strategic’ interests.

They also suggest that Khan is being used as a pawn by those segments of the agencies who want to drive a hard bargain with the US on the issue of aid.

It is yet to be seen whether Imran Khan is able to transform his messianic appeal into actual votes.

Shah Mehmood Qureshi

A staunch PPP member and then the current government’s foreign minister, Qureshi suddenly resigned from his post due to the Raymond Davis incident that saw an American spook being allowed to leave after shooting down two Pakistanis in Lahore.

Qureshi held an emotional press conference accusing his party of bowing down to American pressure. This act turned Qureshi into a messianic figure – for exactly a week or so.

As young urbanites excitedly began dreaming of the emergence of a handsome, honourable and clean politician who can challenge the likes of Zardari and Nawaz, evidence began pointing towards his gullibility to exploitation by the politicised sections of the ISI.

Though refuting the accusations, there was no refuting the fact that in a matter of weeks Qureshi, who’d began imagining himself as a popular future prime minister, was found dangling in a limbo, largely forgotten and joked about and not knowing where his future political prospects lay.

Zulfiqar Mirza

Even more curious is the case of this PPP leader. An animated Sindh minister in the PPP-led government in Sindh, Mirza was also known to be close to President Zardari.

Nevertheless, he turned the ongoing political tussle between PPP and MQM in Sindh into something more personal, loud-mouthing his way to notoriety, especially among urbanites.

Interestingly though, his recent press conference in which he accused the MQM of murder and terrorism, suddenly turned many anti-PPP (even some pro-PPP) and anti-MQM youngsters into hailing him as ‘saviour of Sindh and Karachi!’

Many of them were the same folks who’d earlier denounced him as a ‘scoundrel,’ ‘drunk’ and ‘uncouth.’

Thus, Mirza, at least for some months, can now enjoy the status of being perhaps the most unlikely of political messiahs of them all.

Nadeem F. Paracha is a cultural critic and senior columnist for Dawn Newspaper and Dawn.com.

Pakistan likely to see two Eids...again

Most parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa set to celebrate Eid a day ahead of the rest of the country.

PESHAWAR: The controversy of two eids is likely to continue this year as well as with most parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa set to celebrate Eid a day ahead of the rest of the country.

The traditional moon-sighting committee of Masjid Qasim Khan in Pesahwar will be holding a committee today under Mufti Shahab-ud-Din Popalzai.

The committe had earlier sighted moon a day earlier as well to mark the start of the holy month of Ramzan.

If the committee sights the moon this evening, most parts of the province will be observing eid on Tuesday.

The conflict is many years old as the official moon-sighting committe does not recognise the authority of the Qasim Khan Mosque.

The central moon-sighting committee under Mufti Muneeb is likely to hold a meeting tomorrow.

The Met office has predicted moon could be sighted on Tuesday.

Ironically, this year, Eid ul Fitr is expected to be observed on the same day all over the world. According to Saudi astrologists there is no chance of a moon sighting in Saudi Arabia on the evening of Monday 29 August and hence Ramazan will be 30 days long, ending on August 30.

I had a chance to watch Zulfiqar Mirza's press conference on Sunday; one that has sent shockwaves all the way from Karachi to Islamabad. However, while there are broad points on which I agree with Mr Mirza, I could not help but notice cracks developing in the PPP.

Mirza and the PPP

It is very strange that in a period of mere months one can readily identify at least two PPP leaders, i.e. Shah Mehmood Qureshi and now Zulfiqar Mirza, who have left their portfolios, professed love and commitment to an ailing PPP, which appears to shun them in response. But the most interesting facet of both resignations is the expressed admiration of both leaders for the Pakistan Army and intelligence community. At one time, statements such as 'the ISI is the only force currently saving Pakistan from oblivion' were heard from pseudo-intellectuals like Zaid Hamid. However, it now echoes within the halls of the fallen.

Is there some greater agenda at work here? Is the Pakistan establishment creating another new fifth column from within the ranks of these ex-veteran jiyalas?

Let’s play: 20 questions for Zulfiqar Mirza

Sindh’s former home minister Zulfiqar Mirza has announced his resignation from the government in yet another media circus.

During TV interviews he made personal attacks against journalists and politicians, making references to their facial features and appearance. However, his emotional outburst left lots of questions on the policy of the government unanswered.

A few questions I would like to ask Mr Mirza are:

1) If you claim to be so truthful, why have you never made these revelations before?

2) According to you, Rehman Malik does everything on the discretion of President Asif Ali Zardari. Why then is Rehman Malik accused of conspiring against the People’s Party and not President Zardari?

3) Is the president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari a fool to not understand the shrewdness of Rehman Malik?

4) Mirza Sahab, why did you never raise your voice in 2001 (or afterwards) when you got to know that MQM chief Altaf Hussain wrote a letter against the ISI?

5) What exactly made you speak up after the discovery of the torture cells and ammunition from Lyari?

6) You acknowledge that Rehman Malik is a “good politician and a good human being” but maintain that he is also a compulsive liar. What does this mean?

7) You placed the Holy Quran on your head and said that MQM has a false mandate in Karachi and Hyderabad. How many petitions have you filed in court about this?

8) Why are superior courts, Pakistani forces and Pakistani law enforcement agencies not taking any action on the MQM’s alleged crimes? Is the MQM really that powerful?

9) CPLC recovered most of the kidnapped people from Lyari. Is this the reason why the CPLC chief, Ahmed Chinoy, has suddenly turned into a villain?

10) You seem to be very worried about the people of Sindh. Why are you obsessed with Karachi only? Has karo-kari, dacoity and corruption ended in interior Sindh?

11) How many hospitals and schools have you built in your own constituency?

12) You say that you will fight against the criminal elements of Karachi in your private capacity. Is this legal?

13) Keeping in mind that a civilian cannot take the law into his own hands, how would you decide who is a criminal and who is not?

14) You claim that you haven’t recruited any MQM worker in the Sindh Police, and that recruitment in the police department was done on merit only. If this is so, then why does corruption and incompetency still prevail in the Sindh Police?

15) Why are the ISI chief and Army Generals not taking action on your “substantiated evidence”?

16) When are you going to the Supreme Court to submit this evidence?

17) How exactly have President Asif Zardari and the late Benazir Bhutto helped you in acquiring such a huge amount of money, villas, cars, sugar mills and thousands of acres of lands?

18) You alleged that during a meeting in London, the MQM chief Altaf Hussain had told you that America and other world powers had decided to ‘break’ Pakistan, and that Altaf Hussain had supported their idea. Since when has Altaf Hussain started sharing such secrets with you?

19) If America wants to break Pakistan up, according to you, then why did you go to the enemy country for a 40-day vacation?

20) Sir, do you still stand by your slogan “Pakistan na Khappay” (We don’t want Pakistan)?

Pakistani politics witnessed a new first. Holding the Holy Quran in his hand and then placing it upon his head, Sindh’s senior minister Zulfiqar Ali Mirza made some very bold revelations against his friend’s key, even if troubled, political ally as well as his friend’s closest and most handy aide.

President Asif Ali Zardari perhaps now faces the biggest challenge of his political career as none other than his most loyal friend and senior minister Sindh, Zulfiqar Ali Mirza, at a press conference issued a loaded charge sheet. Mirza gave specific information along with alleged evidence, against all those he accused. He said the ongoing operation was meaningless and that the real killers were not being apprehended.


Zulfiqar Mirza’s attack has produced a complex political dynamic. One with the ‘evidence’ that Zulfiqar Mirza claims he has against the MQM’s alleged involvement in target killings, he has put the MQM under pressure. An MQM on the defensive provides political leverage to the PPP in its ongoing negotiations with that party. It may also help to stem the growing alienation of the Sindhis against the PPP leadership, especially earlier the mishandling of the revival of the local bodies.


The claims made by Zulfiqar Mirza can also potentially strengthen the PPP’s hand in the Supreme Court’s suo motto hearing on the Karachi target killing. The SC bench now meeting in Karachi is bound to call Zulfiqar Mirza to make good his claims in court.


(Read: Suo motu action on Karachi – CJ seeks report from chief secretary, IGP Sindh)


But the most challenging for PPP’s internal politics is Mirza’s attack on Rehman Malik. Zulfiqar Mirza has made specific charges against the interior minister, holding him responsible for leading a “farcical operation” and for being primarily committed to keeping the MQM on board. In addition to his criticism at the press conference, Zulfiqar Mirza, later in a television program insisted that the interior minister “is Pakistan’s enemy and if Pakistan breaks up, then Rehman Malik will be responsible for it.”


Although Mirza insisted that he would remain loyal to the president till his dying day and would give his life in the party’s service, within the immediate context he has created major political challenges for the president. He has alleged that the president’s right-hand man is hand in glove with the killers of innocent citizens.


As for whether these extraordinary revelations will lead to any action against Rehman Malik or the MQM, the punch-line comes from Zulfiqar Mirza himself. While speaking on television he said, “I have rolled the ball, now the ball in the court of the president, army chief, the ISI chief, the PM, the speaker of parliament and the chairman of the senate.” Mirza expects them to use the evidence that he has presented to take action against the MQM and the interior minister. He said the moment the CJP asks him to present himself in court, he will do so.


Zulfiqar Mirza may have become a thorn in the president’s side. But Mirza is one PPP leader that the president will not find it easy to sideline. He will also not able to easily brush aside the alleged charge sheet presented against Rehman Malik nor the MQM. Clearly these moves by Zardari’s closest friend puts the Karachi operation in an even greater spotlight and for all the wrong reasons. It also sharply exposes the weaknesses in Zardari’s politics of “mufahimmat.”


The questions that Mirza’s charge sheet raises only confirms public criticism of the operation. Questions that have no easy answers but ones that will now be repeatedly asked by many political and non-political stake-holders from across the country.

Asking extortionists to leave...

Sindh Chief Minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah has warned extortionists to leave Karachi and go somewhere else. Where does the chief minister want the extortionists to go? Lahore? Rawalpindi? Islamabad? Instead of taking stern measures to deal with these criminals, our chief minister is requesting the criminals to leave his city and go somewhere else. Strange!

Why doesn't the CM himself go somewhere else and let some competent person take charge of his office?

Into Gaddafi's Bunker: The Rebels Overrun the Regime's Nerve Center

After hours of pounding battle on Tuesday, Libya's rebels smashed through the fortified perimeter of Muammar Gaddafi's compound in western Tripoli — the nerve center of the old regime — in the late afternoon, sending huge plumes of black smoke over the city, and perhaps dealing a fatal blow to Gaddafi's ability to cling to power. Footage apparently shot by rebels and aired on al-Jazeera showed armed rebels deep inside the Bab al-Aziziyah complex, rejoicing as they clambered upon the ruins of Gaddafi's old house, which was bombed by U.S. jets in 1986 and had been left by Gaddafi as a memorial to the West's evils.

This time, it was his rebel foes — and likely the last foes of his 42-year iron rule — who owned the territory. Explosions and what sounded like bursts of sniper fire resounded across the city from the complex throughout Tuesday, as rebels fought pitched battles, attempting to rout the last remaining fighters inside; the complex has been thought to be the sanctuary of Gaddafi's most hard-core fighters, some officials and close advisers and perhaps even the fugitive leader himself since the rebels stormed the capital on Sunday night. "We are liberating Libya from north to south," said Mahmoud Shammam, a spokesman for the rebels' National Transitional Council (NTC).

Yet even as Pentagon officials announced in Washington that the rebels appeared to control much of Libya's capital, the rebels' apparent military breakthrough was tempered by a setback earlier in the day, when Saif al-Islam Gaddafi — who had supposedly been in rebel custody — appeared as a free man, relaxed and smiling. His appearance in the early hours of Tuesday morning shattered the sense that the rebels' victory in Libya was at hand. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's son was seen talking to the press while surrounded by supporters, raising concerns that the opposition might be struggling to knit together a cohesive government-in-waiting as it battles to finally crush Gaddafi's regime — as well as to hunt down the fugitive leader himself.

Invisible millions pay price of

statelessness

People rejected by countries they call home live in a shadowy limbo

 

Rejected by the countries they call home and denied the most basic of rights, stateless people live in a shadowy limbo — in the words of one such person, like being "between the earth and the sky."

Up to 15 million people are stateless, not recognized as nationals by any country. They are some of the most invisible people on the planet — an anonymity the United Nations hopes to lift when it launches an international campaign on Thursday to highlight their plight.

"One of the big problems we have is that this simply is not recognized as being a major issue globally," said Mark Manly, head of the stateless unit at the U.N. refugee agency UNHCR.

"In the media there's very little discussion, in universities there's very little research and in the U.N., until relatively recently, there hasn't been a lot of discussion either, so the effect of all that is that we still have major gaps in our knowledge," Manly told AlertNet, a humanitarian news service run by the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Statelessness exacerbates poverty, creates social tensions, breaks up families and destroys children's futures. In some cases it can even fuel wars when disenfranchised people pick up weapons, as has happened in Ivory Coast and Democratic Republic of Congo.

Yet only 38 countries have signed the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which marks its 50th anniversary on Aug. 30.

One of the largest stateless groups is the Rohingyas, a Muslim people of South Asian descent refused citizenship by the Myanmar government. Hundreds of thousands are scattered throughout Bangladesh and Southeast Asia.


"There are no countries in this world for Rohingyas," said Kyaw Myint, 44, now living in Malaysia.



"Even animals can have peace of mind, but for the Rohingyas, because we are stateless, there is no peace of mind."



The effects vary by country, but typically stateless people are barred from education, healthcare and formal employment. They often can't start a business, own property, hold a driving license or open a bank account. They can't get married legally or travel abroad to work or visit family.



And they can't vote, which means they can't elect politicians who might be able to improve their lot.

Being stateless is like being "between the earth and the sky", said Mohamed Alenezi, a Bedouin from Kuwait.

"You are here and not here," added Alenezi, 42, who now lives in London.

Like many Bedouins (stateless Arabs) he is the descendant of nomadic Bedouin tribes which for centuries roamed freely across what is now Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.

Origins of statelessness

Probing the origins of statelessness is a lesson in world history and geography.

In many cases groups failed to be included when their countries became independent or drew up a new constitution. Many Kuwaiti Bedouins fell through the cracks when the country became independent in 1961, and the Roma in Europe have faced major problems in obtaining citizenship in the new countries that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Manly said the UNHCR is closely watching the succession of South Sudan. It is also scrutinizing the drafting of Nepal's new constitution amid fears millions could end up stateless.

A major factor behind statelessness is often racial or ethnic discrimination. Syria, for example, denationalized many Kurds in 1962 and Mauritania expelled around 75,000 Black Mauritanians in 1989.

Stateless people are vulnerable to exploitation, including slavery and prostitution, and risk arbitrary detention. Their lack of identity can make accessing legal help impossible — no one knows how many stateless people are locked up worldwide.


Manly said the UNHCR is closely watching the succession of South Sudan. It is also scrutinizing the drafting of Nepal's new constitution amid fears millions could end up stateless.

A major factor behind statelessness is often racial or ethnic discrimination. Syria, for example, denationalized many Kurds in 1962 and Mauritania expelled around 75,000 Black Mauritanians in 1989.

Stateless people are vulnerable to exploitation, including slavery and prostitution, and risk arbitrary detention. Their lack of identity can make accessing legal help impossible — no one knows how many stateless people are locked up worldwide.


Among the biggest sufferers are children. Open Society Foundations, the George Soros initiative which among other things tries to improve the lives of marginalized people, estimates around 5 million children globally are stateless, often simply because their parents are.

The 1961 convention stipulates signatories must grant nationality to a person born in their territory who would otherwise be stateless. Experts say this is key to resolving the problem.

"This is really a crucial principle that needs to be realized if you want to break the cycle of statelessness," said Sebastian Kohn, Open Society's expert on statelessness.

"It doesn't mean giving nationality to everyone born on your territory. It's just about giving nationality to


stateless persons born on your territory."

Kohn also urged governments to abolish citizenship laws which discriminate against women -- another big cause of statelessness. In at least 30 countries, mothers cannot pass nationality to their children. If the father is stateless, foreign or absent, the child usually ends up stateless.

Some hope

There have been some successes. For example, Sri Lanka has amended laws to allow Hill Tamils, descendants of immigrants from India, to obtain nationality. Ukraine has reintegrated Crimean Tartars deported to Central Asia under Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin.

And experts believe awareness is growing.


"I think states are actually starting to recognize that there is a potential overlap between statelessness and national security issues," Kohn said.


"Obviously, if you disenfranchise people . that can lead to all sorts of social and potentially security issues, and in the worst cases civil war."


In December the UNHCR will host a ministerial-level meeting where countries will be asked to join the 1961 convention and make pledges to address specific concerns on their territory.


"It's an issue whose time has come," said Maureen Lynch, a consultant to the International Observatory on Statelessness.


Copyright 2011 Thomson Reuters. Click for restrictions.


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A land in the grip of fairytales If there is a single country across the planet endlessly obsessed with its origins – how it came to be created and on what basis – it has to be the Islamic Republic, Gen Kayani’s Fortress of Islam.

Nuke capability, Allah be praised, we have attained, and when in moments of patriotic emotion we sing its praises, we give the impression that nothing else matters. But simple things, like running municipal services with a modicum of efficiency or being able to think rationally about a basic need such as public transport, seem beyond our foremost abilities.

Colonialism may have been bad in every sense of the word, but at least it gave us two things: an administrative edifice based on that much-abused term “the rule of law” and a basic infrastructure: roads, canals, a railway system, and so on. We can see for ourselves what we have done with this heritage. Where we should have built upon it we have presided over its vandalising. What is more, deriving pleasure from this experience.

If the Islamic Republic has one ruling deity, real estate would beat everything else into second place. Generals have triggered needless wars, but if the military has excelled in anything it is not, perish the thought, the art of war, but the acquisition and embellishment of real estate. Our defence housing authorities have no parallel anywhere else in the world. Nor is there the least interest in abolishing this culture. If put to the test, the army can forego its guns, not its housing colonies.

And this is the army of the Fortress of Islam. Buttressing its flanks is that misty concept used as a punitive instrument to keep the recalcitrant in line, the ideology of Pakistan.

Six decades of fitful existence is a long enough time to put theories of existence to one side and concentrate on the practical aspects of running a country. But, no, a national politician says something sensible – our national leaders not being particularly famous for saying sensible things – to the effect that we should live like good neighbours with India, and the ideology-of-Pakistan school, whose contribution to the spread of national bigotry and ignorance over the years has been greater than anyone else’s, rips into him as if what has been uttered is the biggest heresy of all.

Oliver Twist asks for a second bowl of porridge and in the orphanage in which he is lodged consternation breaks out, because the unbelievable has just occurred. From table to table the whisper spreads: “Oliver Twist has asked for more.” In the haunts of national ideology we have heard thunder erupting because Nawaz Sharif has spoken of a sensible relationship with India. And because, unspeakable heresy again, he said that the Lord of the Universe was Lord to all of us, not just Muslims.

If the savants of national ideology could have their way India, and Pakistan would not just be at war, their cherished desire, but lobbing nuclear bombs at each other. They seriously ask, what is our nuke capability for? The implication being that if not for use against India, for what then?

The army seriously believes that nuke capability is not enough of a deterrent. In order to achieve nuclear stability, and consequently forestall the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, it is essential that conventional arms capability keep on improving. That is, more rockets and more tanks. This is not just logic reversed, put on its head, but strategy, and the concept of deterrence, gone mad: a recipe for bankruptcy.

Sharif may have started his political journey from the bosom of military rule, but if his remarks on India are taken as a signpost he has come a long way. The fount of misplaced patriotism was always Punjab. And so virulent was this strain of patriotism, championed first and foremost by the ideology-of-Pakistan school of thought, that it spread a message of intolerance.

The people of East Pakistan were alienated. Now it is the youth of Balochistan none too happy with their plight. So for a Punjabi politician to call for a lessening of the paranoia which has been a characteristic of establishment thinking in Pakistan is nothing short of remarkable.

We remain a confused country which could do with less ideological claptrap. But the good thing about the reaction to Sharif’s remarks is that the attack on him has come mainly from the trenches and outposts of the far right. Sharif was once a creature of the far right himself. For someone like him, a scion of Punjab to boot, to undergo a shift to the centre is a positive development. While it has become a fashion to be pessimistic about Pakistan’s future, we should take note of some of the good things happening.

The other good thing is that extremism seems to have run its course. Or at least it has reached the highest points of its expansion. This may sound like an unnecessarily bold statement but it can be put into context.

Pakistan, more than any other nation in the world, can bear witness to the fact that it has seen every form of extremism: sectarian to I don’t know what. With every firebrand and holy warrior taking the shortest route to heaven we have become familiar. The jihadi organisations we have spawned can proliferate no further. North Waziristan or the rest of Fata cannot become more safe havens than they already are. Like a drunk reaching the limits of drunkenness, where his liver can take no more, we have exhausted the limits of extremism.

The ideology-of-Pakistan school has thus served its purpose. Into the hapless body (still not the carcass) of the Republic further ideology cannot be injected. It just can’t take any more. We have also reached the limits of hypocrisy. We would have to be more creative than we are to write further chapters in the saga of national hypocrisy. (Have the defenders and warriors of the Holy Grail reached the limits of real estate? This is a question not easily answered.)

Does this mean that the time for reinventing the Republic has finally arrived? But we can move closer to a less ambitious agenda. Asked what communism was, Lenin famously said: “Soviet power plus electrification of the entire country.” Why can’t we have a similar definition of the ideology of Pakistan?

Why can’t the ideology of Pakistan be to put every child in school, have one curriculum for the entire country, have taxis running on meters, have a public transport system in every major city? Why can’t the ideology of Pakistan, to the exclusion of everything else, be these things: a crash programme to overcome the energy crisis, a crash programme to revive Pakistan Railways and an overnight programme to rid the republic of that devil’s invention which is the polythene bag?

The polythene bag will destroy Pakistan sooner, and more effectively, than the Taliban. Don’t we have the eyes to see its ravages? And a favour: if we can’t fix simple things, let us at least not waste time and energy on metaphysical abstractions.

We know angels won’t descend from heaven to fix these problems. Saladins and Bismarcks we do not have. Greed is a national pastime. The options for change are limited. The stars are implacable in their indifference. We have to create our own miracles, from the material that is available.

But let us also count our blessings, the latest being the confusion into which the ideology-of-Pakistan school has been thrown. Let us agree with Gen Kayani that Pakistan is the Fortress of Islam. Allah again be praised. But we should at least ensure that the drawbridge of this fortress doesn’t creak and the chains are not rusty. The origins of Pakistan have been debated enough. After 64 years, shouldn’t the age of practicality begin?