The military leadership is very serious, at least to the extent of the Malakand division, about eliminating militancy. Malakand has seen a lot of destruction and is going to see more.

It is also clear now that the war will be a long and drawn-out one. The fact is that the problem of militancy will not be solved with the success of the Swat operation because what is happening in Swat and Dir is a part of a game being played in the region. And peace will not be achieved unless militancy is eliminated from the whole region. However, confusion surrounding the operation must be cleared because at the moment it is benefiting the militants.

Here is the crux of the problem. Before 9/11, Pakistani policy-makers considered the Taliban a strategic asset and hence invested heavily in human and financial terms to enable them to sweep from Kandahar to Kabul. All this had to be abandoned under US pressure after 9/11. Nobody wants to dispose of their assets willingly. But there was another reason too. Pervez Musharraf could see that if the Taliban and Al Qaeda's problem ended, his own importance in western circles would also end.

Pakistan sensed that America was not serious in eliminating resistance in Afghanistan and wanted to prolong its stay. Musharraf felt that America wanted to destabilize Pakistan while sitting in Afghanistan and this was compounded by the realization that Washington wanted to consort with India in this endeavour. The US not only allowed India to establish consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar but the Pakistani government also found that the trouble in Balochistan was being sponsored by India – under US encouragement. It was in this context that the Taliban became assets for the Pakistani establishment. The Taliban also took sides against Pakistan due to the latter's support for the US and thus the confusion whether Al Qaeda and the Taliban are friends or foes remains in the Pakistani establishment. It was expected that Barack Obama would review US policy and address Pakistan's concerns but while he addressed some concerns regarding a long-term presence in Afghanistan he seems even more committed to strategic cooperation with India. Also, while on one hand India is not included in Richard Holbrooke's brief on the other it is part of the Afghanistan contact group. Thus the Pakistani establishment is confused whether to treat the militants as enemies or assets.

When these militants target the Marriot in Islamabad, they are the number one enemies of security forces but when they attack the Indian embassy in Kabul then they act like an asset. This is the confusion that still grips the Pakistani establishment.

As a result of this confusion, the militants could not be controlled along the border areas with Afghanistan. Soon the problem came to Pakistan itself: the militants also entered Swat and Bajaur. The American pressure increased and so did the number of people challenging the writ of the state. Thus, some action against them became necessary and resultantly some of them turned their guns on Pakistan. Although they were an extension of the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda, their fight against the Pakistani security forces made them an asset for America, India and other such countries.

There was a time when Russia and central Asian states considered the Taliban and Al Qaeda a threat to their security. Chechen mujahideen were getting support from everywhere, just like Al Qaeda and Taliban. Not only had the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan allied itself with Al Qaeda but militants from other Central Asian states were also sitting in Afghanistan. Therefore Russia and the Central Asian states supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. After 9/11, when America attacked Afghanistan in the name of targeting Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Russia and the Central Asian states supported her. Then the US slowly started to disinvest the Northern Alliance from the government. After Iraq war Russia and the Central Asian states became suspicious of the US and therefore they started considering those resisting as their strategic assets. Now these same Taliban who are a threat inside their own borders in Russia and Central Asia, become an asset inside Afghanistan. And since the Pakistani Taliban are an extension of the Afghan Taliban, they also become an asset for Russia.

The same is with China. Muslim separatists from Sinkiang gathered in large numbers in the Taliban's Afghanistan. Even now one of their organizations, Hizb-e-Islami Turkistan, is active under the banner of Al Qaeda and hundreds of their guerrillas are present in the Pak-Afghan border region. China is worried about its activities and the invitation to a delegation of Jamaat-e Islami (to visit China) was part of this worry. However, in light of American strategies regarding China, those who are giving the US a tough time (Taliban on both sides of the border) become an asset for China and it is also confused.

Arab states are the most interesting. They are under American influence but also unhappy with her. Like Pakistan, they cannot say no to her. Thus wherever they find people who are against the US, their moral support is with such people. These countries know that their people's sentiments are against the US and Israel and these sentiments are translated into action by people like Osama or the Taliban. So although they want to shield their own societies from Al Qaeda and the Taliban, they would like the struggle against the US to continue.

Look at this many-faceted confusion and then think whether people like Zardari, Gilani, Kayani, Hoti or Raisani can chart a course for victory. In my opinion, it is impossible without employing the collective wisdom of the nation and the tragedy is that no effort is being made for it.