What if 9/11 never happened?

They say you cannot understand a beginning until you see the end. And despite the passage of 10 years since that Tuesday morning, we still live in the dust cloud of the fallen towers, unable to pierce the gloom of the present to see where the future will take us. While time will be the best judge of the true importance of the day four hijacked planes were used to attack the world’s sole superpower, a decade on, one can question if September 11, 2001 was indeed a true ‘turning point’ of history, especially for Pakistan. What if 9/11 had never happened? How big a difference would it have made?

According to security analyst Gen. (retd) Talat Masood, the first consequence of 9/11 was that it “brought about a comprehensive change in world outlook as far as the American public was concerned.” Secured by two oceans and safe borders, America had considered itself untouchable.

“It punctured the ‘security bubble’ in which most Americans lived, imagining that wars and violence only happened ‘over there’; that Americans could watch conflict in distant lands on their TVs and occasionally send forth expeditions to help,” says Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Professor at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

He adds: “Had the US not been victim to an act of mega-terrorism, American policy would not have adjusted to the reality that all civilized people now live in a world where super-empowered individuals and small groups can kill on a scale that was previously the preserve of nations.”

And with this realisation came action and consequences – particularly for Pakistan.

A victim of geography

Foremost of the by-products of 9/11 was the launching of a US-led global offensive, military and ideological, which we today call the “War on Terror” – under which the US invaded Pakistan’s neighbour to the west, Afghanistan. The impact on Pakistan was inevitably devastating.

“Pakistan is the one country, aside from Afghanistan, that has suffered the most [as a result of 9/11],” says Masood. “Afghanistan would have continued to be unstable, but the impact [of that instability] on Pakistan would not have been as great,” he says, adding that after the US invasion, there was an “inflow” of militants who escaped from Afghanistan into Pakistan, thus sowing the seeds for future conflicts.

Bad Romance

The invasion of Afghanistan brought Pakistan to the frontline. Pakistan became a ‘key ally’ – a big step up from its near-rogue state classification in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests which resulted in punitive sanctions. To make matters worse, there was a military coup a year later, which further isolated Pakistan from the world.

But after 9/11, things changed.

“US interest in Pakistan would have been peripheral [had 9/11 not occurred]. There were other interests such as [proximity to] Iran, China etc, but not at the level that exists today … It would not have been a key ally to the US in terms of vital strategic interest,” says Masood.

But to establish whether the sudden surge in relations was sustainable, leave alone beneficial, one must re-examine where Washington and Islamabad stood on the eve of 9/11.

When asked about the state of Pak-US relations prior to 9/11, former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence Gen. (retd) Asad Durrani says “there was some sort of rapport … but not very cosy relations.” Durrani, who was the chief of the ISI from 1990-92, a period in which Pak-US relations soured after the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, points out that “Nawaz and Clinton had managed to strike some sort of relationship … after all it was Nawaz who went to Washington after Kargil.”

That said, Prof Allison adds in an important qualifier: “US-Pakistan relations were troubled before 9/11, were troubled after 9/11; [and] will be troubled as far as the eye can see.”

While a temporary period of warmth followed in Pak-US relations post 9/11, things appear almost back to square one a decade later. Pakistan is once again under pressure for its nuclear arsenal, is on the verge of sanctions and is still being lectured for its alleged support for militant outfits.

There are relations – but troubled, much like before 9/11. Indeed, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Of Dictators and Democrats

Running Pakistan in 2001 was Gen Pervez Musharraf, who had taken over in a military coup back in 1999. The US, the stated policy of which is to support democracy, had frosty relations with Pakistan under his military leadership until 9/11, when they needed Pakistan on board and had no option but to work with the general.

On the other end, it can be argued that any sane leader in Musharraf’s place would have inevitably had to join hands with an irked superpower which was, quite literally, out for blood. And inevitably whoever was at the helm of affairs would also have had to deal with the backlash – when the aggrieved militants turned their guns on Pakistan.

It remains a fact however that the war gave an otherwise floundering Musharraf legitimacy and international support, much like the 1979 Soviet invasion had come to General Ziaul Haq’s rescue.

In exchange for his support against extremists, Musharraf was seemingly given a free hand to subvert the political process.

“American support for dictatorial rule would not have been there, and Pakistan would have moved towards democracy a great deal sooner,” says Masood, adding, “Musharraf would not have lasted. Ties were cool – difficult – after Kargil and Musharraf. But that was not a bad thing. Sustained US pressure would have brought about democracy.”

Gen (retd) Hamid Gul, however, thinks otherwise. He says the notion that the US had to support Musharraf after 9/11 is simply false. “Musharraf was put there by the US … they demolished democracy,” he claims, adding that Musharraf was told to take over  but not to declare a full-blown martial law. “Remember, he became the CEO and not a martial law administrator.” Further proof of this collusion, he says, is that the US also accepted his referendum.

‘Betrayal’ and Blowback

Pakistan’s involvement in the War on Terror had a major impact on its own policies, especially when it comes to dealing with militant outfits – patronised or otherwise.

“Pakistan had serious problems – home grown militants promoting its interest in Kashmir, and promoting talibanisation in Afghanistan,” says Masood, but adds that, “this phenomenon could have been managed much easier [had it not been for 9/11]. It would have corrected itself on its own.”

In a world where the towers never fell, Pakistan would have had to ultimately deal with these elements for its own interests, but 9/11 and the US’ new resolve meant that there was little time for dillydallying. They had to do it now, and do it on the US’ terms. Consequently, anti-militancy efforts were to be handled at a pace that wasn’t domestically sustainable or even possible. What was initially a creeping threat of extremism and radicalisation turned into full-blown militancy once Pakistan took an about turn in its domestic policy against militant groups.

“To say that militants suddenly appeared after 9/11 is wrong … there were such people before that as well. However, after 9/11 – as a result of that cooperation [with the US] – it was obvious that these people completely turned against us,” recalls Durrani. Part of the reason was that Pakistan’s reversal was seen as a betrayal by many such groups. The former ISI chief says that there was “an exponential rise in militancy after 9/11 … dormant figures and groups re-emerged … militant groups found space in which to grow.”

Gul, however, strikes a dissenting note, saying it is not the local groups that are attacking Pakistan’s interest, but only those groups being sponsored and funded by foreign powers such as the US. He does agree though that Pakistan was not allowed to find a solution to these elements on its own – and at its own pace.

“They forced us to go into the tribal areas. But when we did, we did so with our own strategy. Remember that there was a peace pact in 2004.” This, he says, angered the Americans who then decided to ramp up pressure and take matters into their own hands.

Naik Muhammad, a militant leader based in the tribal areas, with whom there was a peace pact was killed in the “first American drone strike” many years after 9/11.  The first suicide attack only took place after this, he says.

Isolation was not inevitable

Proponents of Musharraf’s support for the War on Terror would argue that Pakistan did benefit greatly from US support following 9/11. Economically and politically, wasn’t Pakistan in a critical condition before US-led international attention shored it up and bailed it out from a crisis, they ask?

“Though difficult, [the international isolation before 9/11] would have soon been over,” says Masood, talking about the pressure Pakistan faced for its nuclear tests, Kargil and, of course, a military dictatorship.  It’s a view shared by Durrani. “Yes, there were some problems after the nuclear [tests] – but to say we were bankrupt is wrong,” insists Durrani. “Policies pursued by Nawaz and Benazir did have an effect on the economy.”

Things during Musharraf’s era may have “looked better” says Durrani, but he questions how “solid” that economic development was. There was a “squeeze” after Pakistan’s nuclear tests admits Gul. “But other countries were quietly helping. We would have handled it.”

Believing that Pakistan’s economy would have resurged on its own requires Panglossian faith, but one thing is certain: we would have had to take tough decisions, which we’re taking now – on energy, subsidies, and fiscal prudence – back then.

Bailing out Pakistan only delayed the resolving of structural issues in our economy that have persisted to this day.

Pressure and priorities

The most obvious impact of the post-9/11, US-Pakistan ‘partnership’ has been massive loss of life, insecurity and infrastructural destruction.

“Social fabric, political institutions and law and order were affected,” says Masood. But the damage has been more comprehensive than that.

Other, long-term compromises were made as a result of the US presence in Afghanistan and the pressure on Islamabad to make the War against Terror its utmost priority.

The collateral was “the domestic emphasis on education, and improving the economy – the economy has never been given the attention it deserves – critical infrastructure [and] institution building … as a result of a heavy foreign presence in the neighbourhood, these sectors were compromised,” says Masood. We are paying the price for this reorientation today.

If Musharraf’s two years before 9/11 are anything to go by, Pakistan was on a markedly different trajectory priority-wise: the Higher Education Commission had been set up, the National Accountability Bureau had been unleashed and the country was being run by a cabinet of technocrats, not politicians. Another casualty of reprioritising the war on terror was the security that came with an extremely expensive nuclear weapon programme. With a secure nuclear arsenal in hand to fend off Indian adventurism, one can speculate Pakistan would have been able to lessen its expenditure on conventional weapon systems. But fighting militants meant you needed conventional weapons again – and Pakistan’s biggest military asset was useless against this faceless and flexible enemy. Ironically, the nuclear asset itself seemed to now need protection.

When we look back at 9/11 now, it is with the benefit of a decade of hindsight. And hindsight, as they say, is always 20/20.

“We could have managed the situation much better,” concludes Durrani. “It was our responsibility – we could have taken care of it. But our leadership failed [then] and continues to fail [now].”

Published in The Express Tribune, Sunday Magazine, September 11^th,  2011.