Pakistan on Siachen: Change of heart or tactical shift
Hardboiled strategic experts habitually trash any innocent desire for peace with Pakistan as too ambitious an idea that even runs the risk of being labelled as anti-national.
It is out of place to argue with these custodians of national security; in their opinion, probably Mahatma Gandhi too was naive for following the path of non-violence resolutely. Often, the nascent desire for peace is bulldozed with the age-old cynical refrain that ‘peace is not possible with Pakistan’. Trust deficit between India and Pakistan is a reality; once we acknowledge this ugly truth, however, a worse dilemma confronts us: without a genuine peace process, is it possible to bridge the gulf of deep mistrust? The mindset hostage to the historical hatred seems to have made the peace process a chicken-and-egg paradox: what comes first, peace process or overcoming the overwhelming trust deficit?
The majority of peace-seekers in the Indian subcontinent consider the ‘redeployment’ of forces on the Siachen glacier absolutely doable. This understanding originates from the belief that the so-called highest battlefield — the real foe for the soldier is the extremely hostile weather; more Indian and Pakistani soldiers have succumbed to the inhospitable conditions than to bullets — lacks any real strategic importance. Hope that the resolution of Siachen is a possibility also stems from the notion that since India and Pakistan are embroiled in the conflict due to deep mistrust, just a little push in the present relatively relaxed atmosphere may help the two realise the futility of a military engagement in Siachen. Contrary to expectations that the resolution of Siachen, overdue for more than two decades now, can provide impetus to the jammed India-Pakistan peace process, few strategic experts believe it’s not a ‘low-hanging fruit’ that can be plucked first.
Without questioning the prudence of these strategic experts, who like to make us believe that holding the present military positions at a whopping cost of both men and material is of paramount importance to India’s strategic interests, these fixed minds need to pounder over some most pertinent questions. If even Siachen is irresolvable, what else can be resolved between India and Pakistan? And for how long can mere trade and people-to-people contact sustain the spirit of detente in the subcontinent? By propounding an obscure logic, does this closed mindset not confirm the criticism of American strategic expert Stephen Cohen: ‘This combat over a barren, uninhabited netherworld of questionable strategic value is a forbidding symbol of their lingering irreconcilability?’
Ironically, a section of the strategic community in India believes in the dictum that what Pakistan proposes will inevitably negate India’s core interests. An avalanche burying an entire battalion headquarter of the Pakistani army may have hastened the demands of unilateral withdrawal of the Pakistani army from the glacier in that country. Even Pakistan’s army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani, after snow devouring 130 of his soldiers, conceded that Siachen is a ‘difficult front’ and is now in favour of ‘armies should be pulled from the area.’
Pakistan is battling hard for its very existence and peace overtures to India might be a desperate attempt to stabilise its rocking boat. In this backdrop, it becomes very difficult to ascertain whether Pakistan’s change of heart is strategic or a mere tactical shift. Yet India’s options are very limited. India cannot remain insulated to the increasing political instability in its immediate neighbourhood; growing chaos in Pakistan will certainly impact India’s stability.
It is of little consequence whether Pakistan’s peace proposals are a tactical manoeuvring or if that state has undergone a permanent change of heart. However, what matters the most is the fact that Pakistan, including its army, has finally realised that without a friendlier relationship with India, its very survival is at peril. India, instead of remaining fixed in an atmosphere of mistrust, should as a confident nation engage Pakistan in securing South Asia’s future. What shape the resolution of Siachen looks like in the future should not be the real worry; consolidation of the peace process has to be the actual concern. Why should India lock itself in the ‘despair of possibility’, diplomacy is the art of making impossible a possible.Peace with Pakistan is not a choice; securing future of the sub-continent is a moral obligation.
http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column_pakistan-on-siachen-change-of-heart-or-tactical-shift_1680306
It is out of place to argue with these custodians of national security; in their opinion, probably Mahatma Gandhi too was naive for following the path of non-violence resolutely. Often, the nascent desire for peace is bulldozed with the age-old cynical refrain that ‘peace is not possible with Pakistan’. Trust deficit between India and Pakistan is a reality; once we acknowledge this ugly truth, however, a worse dilemma confronts us: without a genuine peace process, is it possible to bridge the gulf of deep mistrust? The mindset hostage to the historical hatred seems to have made the peace process a chicken-and-egg paradox: what comes first, peace process or overcoming the overwhelming trust deficit?
The majority of peace-seekers in the Indian subcontinent consider the ‘redeployment’ of forces on the Siachen glacier absolutely doable. This understanding originates from the belief that the so-called highest battlefield — the real foe for the soldier is the extremely hostile weather; more Indian and Pakistani soldiers have succumbed to the inhospitable conditions than to bullets — lacks any real strategic importance. Hope that the resolution of Siachen is a possibility also stems from the notion that since India and Pakistan are embroiled in the conflict due to deep mistrust, just a little push in the present relatively relaxed atmosphere may help the two realise the futility of a military engagement in Siachen. Contrary to expectations that the resolution of Siachen, overdue for more than two decades now, can provide impetus to the jammed India-Pakistan peace process, few strategic experts believe it’s not a ‘low-hanging fruit’ that can be plucked first.
Without questioning the prudence of these strategic experts, who like to make us believe that holding the present military positions at a whopping cost of both men and material is of paramount importance to India’s strategic interests, these fixed minds need to pounder over some most pertinent questions. If even Siachen is irresolvable, what else can be resolved between India and Pakistan? And for how long can mere trade and people-to-people contact sustain the spirit of detente in the subcontinent? By propounding an obscure logic, does this closed mindset not confirm the criticism of American strategic expert Stephen Cohen: ‘This combat over a barren, uninhabited netherworld of questionable strategic value is a forbidding symbol of their lingering irreconcilability?’
Ironically, a section of the strategic community in India believes in the dictum that what Pakistan proposes will inevitably negate India’s core interests. An avalanche burying an entire battalion headquarter of the Pakistani army may have hastened the demands of unilateral withdrawal of the Pakistani army from the glacier in that country. Even Pakistan’s army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani, after snow devouring 130 of his soldiers, conceded that Siachen is a ‘difficult front’ and is now in favour of ‘armies should be pulled from the area.’
Pakistan is battling hard for its very existence and peace overtures to India might be a desperate attempt to stabilise its rocking boat. In this backdrop, it becomes very difficult to ascertain whether Pakistan’s change of heart is strategic or a mere tactical shift. Yet India’s options are very limited. India cannot remain insulated to the increasing political instability in its immediate neighbourhood; growing chaos in Pakistan will certainly impact India’s stability.
It is of little consequence whether Pakistan’s peace proposals are a tactical manoeuvring or if that state has undergone a permanent change of heart. However, what matters the most is the fact that Pakistan, including its army, has finally realised that without a friendlier relationship with India, its very survival is at peril. India, instead of remaining fixed in an atmosphere of mistrust, should as a confident nation engage Pakistan in securing South Asia’s future. What shape the resolution of Siachen looks like in the future should not be the real worry; consolidation of the peace process has to be the actual concern. Why should India lock itself in the ‘despair of possibility’, diplomacy is the art of making impossible a possible.Peace with Pakistan is not a choice; securing future of the sub-continent is a moral obligation.
http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column_pakistan-on-siachen-change-of-heart-or-tactical-shift_1680306
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