General Parvez Musharraf came to power through a military coup in 1999 and there were celebrations on the streets in Pakistan. His coup was seen as a coup against Washington, and his arrival piggy- backed on latent anti-Americanism in Pakistan. He has now resigned to avoid impeachment and once again there are celebrations in the streets, and his departure is seen as another coup against America and a triumph for Pakistan's not seething anti-Americanism. The end of Musharraf, I suspect, is just the beginning of a dangerous turn that Pakistan has now taken. Musharraf's departure does not solve any of Pakistan's myriad problems; it just adds to them.

Pakistanis do not realize this and many of Pakistani intellectuals disagree with this idea, but I am convinced that in the past twenty years Taliban have slowly colonized Pakistan. Taliban forces and leaders are not only well ensconced in North Western Pakistan but they actually govern the region in alliance with their tribal hosts and to the exclusion of the Pakistani state and military. Taliban's ideas about Islam and politics are slowly being adopted by various other Islamic movements in Pakistan. We can see the effect of the Talibanization of Pakistan even among Pakistani diasporas in the US and especially in Britain. The geopolitical analysis of US foreign policy and the global order advanced by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is now widely shared among non-Islamist non-religious Pakistanis.

"Islamic Emirate of Waziristan"

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As extremism rises, international mobility of Pakistanis will become more and more difficult further undermining prospects for trade and growth

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Unless the Pakistani people make a concerted effort to take back Pakistan and put it back on its foundational track — a democratic Muslim homeland — it is in danger of becoming one big Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. The Taliban are no more an instrument of Pakistani geopolitical machinations, they are independent, more confident, stronger, meaner and with a lot of public support and leverage inside Pakistan.
Pakistan is not just their home away from home; it is now their playground, factory and "the base". Pakistan's economy remains in trouble and the rupee is at its lowest against a dollar which itself is not in the peak of its health. As political uncertainties persist, there will be barriers to international investment and trade. And as extremism rises, international mobility of Pakistanis will become more and more difficult further undermining prospects for trade and growth. As Pakistani policies become less consistent with US demands – Pakistani elite wish to negotiate their way out of the mess, while the US wants them to bomb their way out – US aid will dry up and put more stress on the economy.

US Dilemmas on Afghan-Pakistan Theater

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Now with Musharraf gone, the US is without an ally and without a policy, for its policy in the region was Musharraf.

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Parvez Musharraf was crucial to the US war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. For a few billion dollars, he brought an army, an intelligence service, special insights into Islamist groups in the area and the freedom to operate in and from Pakistan. The Pakistani military not only suffered over 2500 deaths in the war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in its border provinces, it also took part of the blame for the civilians killed in the process.Without Musharraf, the US will have to engage in such military operations, suffer similar casualties and also shoulder blame for the civilians killed. Without the cooperation of the governments in Kabul and Islamabad, the US cannot operate in the area. Even with their support, it has not achieved its goals in seven years. Now with Musharraf gone, the US is without an ally and without a policy, for its policy in the region was Musharraf. Musharraf's resignation is a big blow to the US. The US will have to negotiate with various political parties and the army separately and no one is in position to provide the same degree of cooperation to the US. Unlike Musharraf, the current leadership is wary and suspicious of the US and because it enjoys democratic legitimacy, it is in a better position to reject many of the American demands.
The US task of keeping Pakistani cooperation in the war on terror has increased manifold. The Pakistani leadership is now in fundamental disagreement with US' methods. They feel that Pakistan's extremism problem cannot be done away with by use of force. They also feel that the US is part of the problem. US policies in the region fuel extremism and the heavy handed use of force further alienates those who are not radicalized. The resolution, they feel, will come slowly through peaceful means and through compromise. Basically they are pursuing accommodation while the US is seeking elimination. Unless the US agrees to play ball on Pakistani terms, it will have to pursue its goals without any active help from Islamabad, and perhaps with covert and active opposition from Pakistani intelligence and military. From the outset, the US policy of reliance on Musharraf and force was an unwise strategy. It has failed completely. Bin Laden is still free and Al-Qaeda is strong and active.
Taliban are still there and much stronger now and chipping away at NATO's resolve. Pakistan, a nuclear state and a longtime US ally, is now partially a failed state, no more friendly, but heavily radicalized. Unless Washington acknowledges its errors and adopts a new policy — one made in consultation with Islamabad and sensible voices in America, which neocons hate — NATO, the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan are all in for really tough times ahead.